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Abstract 
Abstract of thesis entitled: 
Person and Man in the Philosophical Anthropology of Max Scheler 
Submitted by CHEUNG Ching-yuen 
for the degree of Master in Philosophy in Philosophy 
at the Chinese University of Hong Kong in August 23'^ 2000. 
Max Scheler (1874-1928) is one of the most original and influential figures in 
modem German philosophy. He is an important figure in the phenomenological 
movement on one side, and he is one of the founders of philosophical 
anthropology on the other. Although his writing project on Philosophische 
Anthropologie could not be completed by the end of his life, many insights on 
the problem of man can be found in the other works of Scheler. The aim of this 
thesis is to re-construct Scheler丨s philosophical anthropology by analysing the 
concepts of person and man. 
"What is man's place in nature?" This is the main question of Scheler's 
philosophical anthropology. It leads us to ask another basic question, "What is 
man? Who is man?" 
This thesis is divided into four chapters. The first chapter is an introduction to the 
central thesis of philosophical anthropology and Scheler's thought. Chapter two 
and three will focus on the concept of person and man respectively. Scheler's 
personalism is the kernel part of his philosophical anthropology and chapter two 
will concentrate on the ethical personalism in his magnum opus. Formalism in 
Ethics and Non-formal Ethics of Values. Chapter three will discuss Scheler's 
theory of man, with topics on man and feelings, man as ens emans, spirit and life, 
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Person and Man 
in the Philosophical Anthropology 
of Max Scheler 
Chapter One Introduction 
When I commenced the study of man, I saw that these abstract sciences are 
not suited to man and that I was wandering farther from my own state in 
examining them than others in not knowing them. I pardoned their little 
knowledge; but I thought at least to find many companions in the study of 
man and that it was the true study which is suited to him. I have been 
deceived; still fewer study it than geometry. It is only from the want of 
knowing how to study this that we seek the other studies. (Pascal, Pensees, 
144)1 
Pascal pointed out a phenomenon in his time: people spend more time on 
abstract sciences such as geometry, but they pay little attention to the study of 
man or human. Although it is meaningful for us to focus on the study of 
ourselves, it seems to be an issue with little importance. One may even say that 
man has forgotten the problem of man. But this is not the truth. In fact, different 
people from different cultures and disciplines have been seeking the answer of 
the question "What is man?" Each person may think of an idea of man from his 
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own mind. Amazingly, there have been thousands of concepts and images of 
man since man realized his existence in the world. 
From a theoretical point of view, the problem of man may be the most 
difficult one in the history of mankind, not because of our inability to answer the 
question, but there are so many answers. One can easily find different pictures of 
man from disciplines such as psychology, anthropology, sociology, linguistics, 
etc. But there are also images of man in the fine arts, history or even literatures 
such as tragedies, poems and science fictions. 
From a cultural perspective, man is even shaped by the unique environment 
and climate he faces as well as the inherited history and tradition. We are 
different people or different ethnos with great varieties. Consequently, "human" 
is better regards as "humans" in order to emphasize our diversities. 
Although many of the ideas or theories of man mentioned above seem to be 
successful in answering the questions, most of them are one-sided. Some of them 
are even incommensurable among each other. Indeed, it is not an easy task to 
find an answer to the question. The manifold meanings of man lead to a crisis of 
the identity of man: there are too many theories on man but we can no longer 
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understand who we are, as Max Scheler claims: "... man is more of a problem to 
himself at the present time than ever before in all recorded history. "3 
In order to draw a complete picture of man, it is necessary for us to return to 
the study of man. That is to answer the question: who we are? 
7 
I The Study of Man 
The essence of the ancient philosophical Greek culture can be represented 
by the maxim "Know thyself! ” {Gnothi seauton), located at the Delphic o r a c l e . 4 
This acute imperative can be understood at least in a double sense: First, it is a 
teleological notion to recall us to re-think who we are. Second, we are beings 
with limitations, and we are forgetting the task from time to time. Although it is 
not easy for someone to know himself, it should be the life-long task for all 
mortals. 
From this ancient inscription, it is revealed that the essence of man is a 
traditional concern. It is an issue with a clear philosophical purpose, namely, to 
study the essence of man. For this reason, it is an important task especially for 
those who are the lovers of wisdom, or philosophers in general. In fact, "Know 
thyself!" was a dictum shared by philosophers such as Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, 
as well as Augustine, Aquinas and Descartes. 
The study of man is a central theme in ancient Greek philosophy. In fact, the 
word "anthropology" is originated from Greek words anthropos and logos, 
meaning the knowledge or theory of man. Nowadays, it is known as a discipline 
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concerning different phenomena of human beings, including the study of man's 
origins, classifications, races, social relations and cultures. At the end of 16th 
century (1593), the discipline Anthropologia was introduced to many German 
universities.5 Immanuel Kant, one of the most prominent figures of modem 
European philosophy and Enlightenment, also studied and taught anthropology 
in the university. For Kant, philosophy can be divided into three areas: 
metaphysics, morals and religion. In Critique of Pure Reason, he proposed three 
basic questions of his philosophy, namely, what can I know? What ought I to do? 
What may I hope for?^ The three questions concern the use of pure reason, 
practical reason and the reason of judgment. Kant claims that the aim of 
philosophy is not to produce scholastic theories on reason but to philosophized 
In the Jasche version of Logic, he summarized the three philosophical problems 
into one single question: 
The field of philosophy in this cosmopolitan sense can be brought down to 
the following questions: 
1. What can I know? 
2. What ought I to do? 
3 • What may I hope? 
4. What is man? 
Metaphysics answers the first one, morals the second, religion the third, and 
anthropology the fourth. Fundamentally, however, we could reckon all of 
this as anthropology, because the first three questions relate to the last one 
9 
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For Kant, the most fundamental issue of philosophy is the study of man.) 
Retrospectively, Kant should be regards as the forerunner of philosophical 
anthropology, since he tried to tackle the problem of man from a philosophical 
dimension. 
Strictly speaking, however, philosophical anthropology as an academic 
discipline was only a recent event in the history of mankind. It emerged in 
Germany in the 19th century, when there was an increasing interest in the study 
of man rather than classical epistemology and metaphysics.^^ 
Philosophical anthropology can be defined as a discipline concerning the 
problem of man, which seeks to answer the question of man from a concrete 
philosophical standpoint. The history of philosophical anthropology can be 
regards as the history of man's self-knowledge. 
10 
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II Philosophical Anthropology and other Sciences of Man 
There are many other disciplines that deal with the question: "What is 
man?" For examples: sociology, psychology and ethnology. These disciplines 
presuppose their own anthropology or scientific views of man. However, it is 
necessary to distinguish the differences between philosophical anthropology 
from other sciences of man. 
Modem sociology is founded by Auguste Comte, who introduced a positive 
method to the studies of man and society. Although philosophical anthropology 
and sociology share a common notion that man is a social animal, philosophical 
anthropology should never be regards as a positive science. Man is a social being, 
but there are other aspects of man. For examples, man is an animal capable of 
feeling, love and spiritual acts. These phenomena of man are beyond the field of 
objective science. 
Similarly, philosophical anthropology is different from modem psychology, 
although it is deeply influenced by Gestalt psychology and psychoanalysis. 
Psychology concerns the mental activities or personalities of a "subject." 
However, philosophical anthropology does not presuppose man as the "object" 
11 
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of sociological investigations or the "subject" of the psychological investigations. 
Man is a spiritual person who should never be reduced as an "object," a 
"subject," or any kinds of consciousness. 
In addition, it is crucial to specify philosophical anthropology from 
ethnology or modem anthropology. Modem anthropology is a discipline dealing 
with human races and cultures. It can be further subdivided into physical 
anthropology and cultural anthropology. The former is a science on the physical 
characters of different ethnic groups. It is a scientific discipline based on field 
works and archaeological researches. One of the main themes of physical 
anthropology is the problem of the origin of man. Cultural anthropology, on the 
other hand, is a discipline concerning human cultures. The central problem of 
cultural anthropology is to understand a culture beyond ethnocentrism or cultural 
monism. Nevertheless, philosophical anthropology does not deal with the 
science of the origin of man or the problem of ethnocentrism. Rather, it deals 
with the controversy on the essence of man, which is indeed the essential 
problem of all anthropologies. 
Michael Landmann is right to argue that: "Modem philosophical 
anthropology does not originate from scholarly interest, but from a universally 
12 
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felt need of the time."" One may find that philosophical anthropology is closely 
related to Lebensphilosophie and Existentialism, which were predominated in 
the beginning of 20th century. 
Lebensphilosophie, founded by Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911), is a study on 
the problem of life (Leben). For Dilthey, life is the unique phenomenon of man 
including instincts, feelings and passions, which cannot be reduced into a single 
notion of reason or understanding. Both traditional rationalistic metaphysics and 
modem sciences fail to account for the phenomenon of life, as life can neither be 
understood by speculative objectification or by scientific observation. Dilthey 
emphasizes that the study of life should receive a method of its own. In order to 
study life autonomously, he proposed a new discipline called "human sciences" 
(Geisteswissenschaften, literally rendered as "systematic studies on human | 
spirit"). 
In the "Preface" to Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften {Introduction to 
Human Sciences, 1883), Dilthey writes: "... the human sciences that constitute a 
system which is independent in its own r igh t .Accord ing to Dilthey, human 
sciences are different from natural sciences {Naturwissenschaften) that the 
former ones require understanding (Verstehen) but the latter ones require a 
13 
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different method, i.e. explanation {Erkldrung)P Human sciences are different 
from natural sciences and the two disciplines have their own measures and 
proofs. Therefore, one should not reduced human sciences into any kinds of 
natural science. 
As a psychologist, Dilthey's doctrine of descriptive psychology opposes 
explanatory psychology, for the latter is based on scientific observations. It is 
one-sided to study man from mere scientific observations or experiments. From 
the viewpoint of Lebensphilosophie, man should never be thought as a ready-
made thing. It is a major mistake to assume man as an objectified being. On the 
contrary, man is a historical being. Man is a special kind of creature in the 
universe called creatura creatrix ("creating creature，’). Landmann explained the 
significance of Dilthey's concept of man: | 
1 
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Another important contribution to anthropology made by 
Lebensphilosophie ... was Dilthey's insight that man is not first an already 
completed man and then has a history, but that, in addition to being nature, 
he is history. It is part of man's innermost being, always to be a historical 
particularized man. Not fixed once and for all by nature, but malleable and 
variable, he is stamped into an unrepeatable unique person depending on the 
respective ages and nations, or rather - creatura creatrix - he stamps himself 
as such. 14 
14 
The developments of the Lebensphilosophie and the human sciences had great 
impact to scholars from different disciplines, especially to Franz Brentano 
(1838-1917) and Carl Stumpf (1848-1936).^' 
While Lebensphilosophie deals with the phenomenon of life, existentialism 
is another philosophy of man concerned on man's existence. Existentialists such 
as Kierkegaard, Sartre and Jarpers study man from a philosophical standpoint. 
They conclude man is the subject, who has the ultimate freedom of choice. This 
central thesis of existentialism is best described by Sartre, who suggests 
"existence precedes essence. 
However, philosophical anthropology and existentialism have complete 
different philosophical standpoints. Unlike existentialism, philosophical 
anthropology does not presuppose man as a mere subject. Rather, man is | 
i 
described as an individual person as well as a collective person. It is erroneous to 
assume man as a mere subjectivity or individuality. Existentialism ignores the 
essential everyday relationships among "I’" "thou," "we," etc. Landmann 
explained the fundamental differences between the two studies of man: 
Existentialism cuts a sector out of a more complex context and absolutizes it. 
Anthropology encompasses the individual as well as the species; 
existentialism sees only the individual. It has the fascination, but also the 
easy refutability of all o n e s i d e d n e s s . " 
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Many sciences of man have reduced the rich content of man into a single 
phenomenon or a one-sided notion, but philosophical anthropology tries to 
account for the complete picture of man. That is the reason why philosophical 
anthropology is distinguished from other philosophical doctrines of man such as 
empiricism, rationalism and mechanism. 
Similarly, philosophical anthropology is different from other scientific 
studies of man such as physiology, anatomy, biology, etc. Nonetheless, 
philosophical anthropology is not intended to eliminate other anthropologies or 
other sciences of man, since many of these disciplines have successfully 
explained some particular phenomena of man. For example, man can be 
objectified biologically as a biological machine, but man should not be | 
I I 
conceived as a mere mechanic body as such. 
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Ill Max Scheler,s Place in Philosophical Anthropology 
One of the most important figures in the movement of philosophical 
anthropology is Max Scheler (1874-1928), who is often regards as "the founder 
of the philosophical anthropology of our century.Unfortunately, his works 
were banned during the Nazi years of 1933 to 1945.19 Many scholars in the 
English-speaking world could have known Scheler earlier and better, but in 
reality none of his main works was translated into English until 1954.^^ Besides, 
there is only a relatively small collection of secondary literature on his 
philosophy.2i 
Scheler, following the Kantian tradition, regards philosophical 
anthropology as the most fundamental branch of philosophy. However, he did 
i 
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not formulate his problematic on anthropology at his early years. Scheler's I 
academic life, as suggested by Manfred Frings, is divided into three periods. The 
first stage is the preparatory period (1895 tol910), the second stage is the 
productive period (1910-1921) and the third stage is the final period (1921-
1928).22 
In the first period, Scheler studied philosophy under the supervision of 
Rudolf Eucken in the University of Jena. He finished his doctoral dissertation 
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"Beitrage zur Feststellung der Beziehungen zwischen den logischen und 
ethischen Prinzipien (Contributions to the Statement of the Relations Between 
Logical and Ethical principles)" and received his doctorate in 1897. Two years 
later, he completed his habilitation thesis {Habilitationsschrift), "Die 
transzendentale und die psychologische Methode (The Transcendental and the 
Psychological Methods)." Soon he gained his Privatdozent (unpaid 
professorship) and began his teaching career from 1901. 
Rather than staying in Jena for a longer period of time, Scheler came back to 
the University of Munich in 1907 and taught philosophy there. At that time, 
Scheler was interested in Edmund Husserl's the phenomenology, which is one of 
the most important philosophical movements in the 20th century. 
Husserl has once interested on the problem of geometry and arithmetic. As a 
mathematician, his early writings include treatises on number and on the origin 
of g e o m e t r y . 2 3 In order to search for the ultimate logic of mathematics, he 
furthered his reflections on philosophy and methodology. In 1900, Husserl 
published the first volume of Logische Untersuchungen, in which he criticizes 
the prevailing logical psychologism, which reduces the foundation of logical 
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concepts and rules into mere psychological f a c t s . 2 4 The problem of 
psychologistic tendency in logic can be solved by phenomenological studies.^^ 
In the second volume of the work published one year later, Husserl 
explained the fundamental position of phenomenology: 
. . .we must go back to the 'things themselves' (Sachen selbst). We desire to 
render self-evident in fully-fledged intuitions that what is here given in 
actually performed abstractions is what the word-meanings in our 
expression of the law really and truly stand for.^^ 
Husserl's motto of phenomenology is "Going back to the things themselves!" 
(auf die ” Sachen selbst “ zuriickgehen). Later, this motto was rendered by 
Heidegger as "To the things themselves!" (Zu den Sachen selbst). For Husserl, 
phenomenology is the only universal philosophical science that focuses on the 
phenomena of life experience. Hence, it is condition of possibility for any further 
genuine philosophical enquires. The methods of phenomenology include the 
principle of evidence, principle of non-presuppositions and phenomenological 
reduction (epoche). Pure phenomenological investigation, according to Husserl, 
is "which follow aspire solely to such freedom from metaphysical, scientific and 
psychological presuppositions•“之？ 
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Husserl and Scheler, along side with Moritz Geiger (1880-1937) and 
Alexander Pfander (1870-1941), were the co-editors of Jahrbuch fur 
Philosophic und Phanomenologische Forschung, published from 1919 to 1930. 
At that time, Scheler has acknowledged his study of Husserl's phenomenology.^^ 
Besides, Scheler, Pfander and Geiger were members of the phenomenological 
Circle in Munich. 
Scheler's phenomenology is different from Husserl's in many aspects. As 
suggested by Manfred Frings, Scheler's basic idea of phenomenology can be 
summarized into the following points: 
Firstly, phenomenology does not base on a method but it is to be based on 
pure intuition (Anschauung). For Scheler, intuition does not mean mere 
sensational acts but includes the perception of values-facts. Intuition is the 
foundation of a person's sensation as well as sensibility. 
Secondly, Scheler assumes that all activities of the spirit {Geist) presuppose 
the self-spatialization and self-temporalization. However, these spiritual 
activities are not based on an independent spatial-temporal consciousness. Pure 
consciousness and pure ego are isolated subjects. On the other hand, "I," ego or 
individual is originally co-given with other persons. Man is a more than a 
20 
consciousness, for he is always in a personal community and in a world of 
persons.29 
Furthermore, Scheler emphasizes on the concepts of self-givenness and 
Wesensschau (essence-intuition) but he rarely discusses the Husserlian 
problematics of intentionality, transcendental reduction, transcendental ego or 
inter-subjectivity. Besides, Scheler applies phenomenology to his studies of love 
and hatred, person and man. These concepts are important elements in his 
project of philosophical anthropology. Husserl, on the other hand, was not 
interested in the movement of philosophical anthropology. He criticizes the 
movement as a kind of anthropologism. In "Phenomenology and Anthropology" 
(1931), Husserl writes: 
Original phenomenology, which has matured into transcendental 
phenomenology, denies to any science of human being, whatever its form, a 
share in laying the foundations for philosophy, and opposes all related 
attempts at foundation-laying as being anthropologism or psychologism.^° 
Husserl refused any naivete of human sciences or philosophical anthropology. 
He suggested only one form of definitive science, "which is the science 
elaborated by the original method of transcendental phenomenology. "31 This 
position can be traced back to the article "Philosophie als strenge 
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Wissenschaft"( 1910), in which he claims that the ultimate task of 
phenomenology is to reform philosophy into a serious science.^^ This notion is 
clearly an antinomy to Scheler's philosophical anthropology and even to 
Dilthey's Geisteswissenschaften 
Due to personal affairs, Scheler quitted the University of Munich in 1910 
and went to Gottingen, where he occasionally gave lectures and talks at the 
philosophical society there. With his talents in philosophy, soon he became the 
leader of the society among scholars such as Aloys Fischer (1880-1937), 
Theodor Conrad (1881-1969), Adolf Reinach (1883-1937), Wilhelm Schapp 
(1884-1965), Kurt Stavenhagen (1885-1951), Hedwig Conrad-Mertius (1888-
1966), Adolf Grimme (1889-1963), Dietrich von Hildebrand (1889-1977), Hans 
Lipps (1889-1941), Jean Hering (1890-1966), Edith Stein (1891-1942), 
Alexandre Koyre (1892-1964) and Roman Ingarten (1893-1970).^^ During this 
period, he published his main works: Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die 
Materiale Wertethik (1913-16), Zur Phdnomenologie und Theorie der 




After World War I, Scheler was appointed as a special chair of philosophy 
and sociology in the University of Cologne.^^ During his last years there, Scheler 
shows less interest in the field of phenomenology. He even argues that: 
...one really should no longer use the word "phenomenology". After all, it 
does nothing but what philosophy has always done.36 
Meanwhile, Scheler was becoming more concerned with the problem of man. 
Later in the famous Mensch und Erde talk in 1927, titled Die Sonderstellung des 
Menschen, Scheler claims “ What is man and what is his place in being (Was ist 
der Mensch, und was ist seine Stellung im Sein)T as his most fundamental 
philosophical questions.^^ This position can be seen in an earlier essay, "Zur Idee 
des Menschen," where he has already argues that his philosophy is concerned 
with the problem of man: 
In a certain sense all the central problems of philosophy can be said to lead 
us back to the questions of what man is and what metaphysical position and 
status he occupies within the totality of being, world and God， 
Scheler suggests that the kernel problem of all philosophical inquiries is the 
problem of man. However, the problem of man was not successfully answered. 
We are facing a critical problem of understanding ourselves: one can only 
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propose some ideas of man from specific sciences (Spezialwissenschaften), but 
he fails to propose a unified idea of man {einheitliche Idee vom Mensch). 
Although it is Scheler's merit to be regards as the founder of philosophical 
anthropology, one may find that it is difficult to account for his concept of man. 
The most fundamental reason is that Scheler could not finish his comprehensive 
work on the theory of man, Philosophische Anthropologic. The current 
posthumous version, edited by Frings, is undoubtedly a useful resource in the 
reconstruction of Scheler's philosophical standpoint. 
In the drafts of Philosophische Anthropohgie, one can discover Scheler's 
ambition to discuss comprehensively many theories of man, which are divided 
into the following categories: 
1) Classical theories (and their underlying forms): Aristotle, Plato, Stoics, 
Augustine, Thomas, Descartes, Leibniz, Kant, Fichte, Hegel. 
2) Jewish Christian theistic teachings (Islam). The confessional theology 
(Dilthey). 
3) Negative theory (Buddha, Schopenhauer). 
4) Naturalistic theories: 
- Vhomme machine 
- Vhomme in Sensualism and Atavism. Hume. 
- Intelligent Being (Wesen); character allocation 
(Zeichenzuordnung). 
- homo faber. 
- Impulse theories (Trieblehren): Machiavelli, Nietzsche, Adler, 
Freud, Marx. 
5) Romantic theories 
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a) Original manisfestation. Schelling. 
b) Soul (Seele) - spirit (Geist). Conflicts. 
c) Sick animal {Krankes Tier). Lessing und Seidel. 
6) Over-man (Ubermensch) and postulatory atheism; Nietzsche, N. 
Hartmann, Kerler, L. Ziegler. 
7) My theory. Schelling, [?], N. Hartmann?� 
Besides, Scheler also prepared a list of concepts of man on his critique of 
anthropological theories, with special interests on the "one-sidedness" 
(einseitigen) and the differences of the concept in history. These concepts 
include: 
1) homo peccans et redivivus (the man who falls and wants to be put up). 
2) homo sapiens (ordinatus et ordinans) Socrates, Posidonius, Plotinus. 
3) homo mechanicus {I'homme machine) etphysicalicus. 
4) homo sensitivus. 
5) homo negans etpatiens (suffering). 
6) homo faber et intelligens (positivism and pragmatism). 
7) homo patheticus et divinans (Geniekult). ; 
8) homo curans (Heidegger). 
9) homo oeconomicus 
10) homo politicus ^ homo vitalis. 
11) homo libidinosus � 
12) super-homo. 
13) homo [？] Duns Scotus, Kant, Fichte. 
[homo] geometricus?奶 
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Other topics in the content of Philosophische Anthropologic include evolution, 
constitution of man, monopoly of man, metaphysics of man (a further study on 
man's metaphysische Sonderstellung), aging and death.4i 
Clearly, during different stages of his life, Scheler focused himself on so 
many philosophical topics, with special concerns in the problems of theology as 
well as sociology. Although Philosophische Anthropologic was written at the 
last years of his life, many kernel ideas in the book can be traced back in his 
earlier works. Concerning the genealogy of his thought, Scheler made a list of 
works in Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos, which can be summarized into 
the following scheme:42 
1. "Zur Idee des Menschen" (1914) and "Das Res sentiment im Aufbau der 
Moralen" (1915); ； 
2. Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die Materiale Wertethik (1913, 1916) and 
Wesen und Formen der Sympathie (1923); 
3. "Mensch und Geschichte" (1926); "Die Wis sens formen and die 
Gesellschaft" (1928); 
4. "Die Formen des Wissens and die Bildung" (1928); "Der Mensch im 
Zeitalter des Ausgleichs" (1928). 
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According to this scheme, Scheler's concept of man is rooted in the problem of 
person, especially in the discussion of ethical personalism, which is a central 
theme in his magnum opus, Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale 
Wertethik. Besides, he is concerned with man's unique phenomena of feelings 
such as love, hatred, ressentiment, etc. In earlier works such as "Zur Idee des 
Menschen," Scheler has already stated that he is concerned with the unity of man 
{Die Einheit des Menschen).” As in his later work Man's Place in Nature, 
Scheler showed that the spirit {Geist) and life {Leben) are two irreducible 
essences of man. 
The aim of this thesis is to re-construct Scheler's philosophical 
anthropology by capturing the philosophical concepts of person and man. 
Accordingly, our discussion will be divided into two parts: the concept of person 
and the concept of man. Scheler's concept of person will be discussed in chapter 
two, with focus on the notion of ethical personalism in Formalism in Ethics. In 
chapter three, there will be a discussion on Scheler's concept of man, especially 
the notion: "man as ens amans" and the concept of ordo amor is. Besides, there 
will be a discussion of the concepts of Geist and Leben, which are the central 
themes of Scheler's famous essay: Man's place in Nature. 
27 
Concerning the philosophical background of the concepts of person and 
man, the histories of the above concepts will be discussed in the beginning of 
chapter two and three respectively. Finally, there will be a brief conclusion in 
chapter four of this thesis. 
28 
Chapter Two Scheler's Concept of Person 
For many philosophers and theologians, person is conceived as a moral 
agent who makes moral decisions with his reason. Scheler is also aware of this 
issue, but he does not reduce man simply into a mere rational subject. For 
Scheler, man is conceived as an ethical person, but this notion does not imply 
that man is a being with moral soul or practical reason only. Ethical person 
should be understood within the context of ethical personalism or non-formal 
ethics, which is developed in Scheler's magnum opus: Formalism in Ethics and 
Non-Formal Ethics of Values. 
Before proceeding to Scheler's notion of ethical personalism, the following 




I On the Concepts of Person 
Who am I? Evidently, I am a man. However, what is the meaning of man 
exactly? One may answer: I am a person, not a thing. It seems clear enough to 
define man as a person. However, is it a tautology to say that man is a person? 
What is the specific meaning of to be a person? 
To answer the above questions, it is important to recall the history of the 
concept of person. Meanwhile, it is of equal significance to clarify the general 
uses of the word person. In ordinary language, "person" means roughly the same 
with "man," "human" or "individual" in the late 20th century. It is commonly 
used in a manner to minimize the masculine meaning in the word "man". For 丨 
I 
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examples, words such as "chairperson" or "spokesperson" are used instead of i 
I? 
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"chairman" or "spokesman". Besides, the word "person" also means the bodily 
appearance of a man. To be present bodily is sometimes stressed by the phrase 
"in person". Hence, to speak of a person is to emphasize the presence or the 
personal identity of someone, especially his status of individuality and autonomy. 
Furthermore, it is common to say X is a good person in order to describe the 
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good character or personality of X. The word "personality" is, however, a 
technical term in the field of personal theories in modem psychology. 
In order to understand further the concept of person, one may also study the 
meaning of person from the field of linguistics. In the grammars of many modem 
European languages, there are at least six forms of personal pronouns divided 
into singular and plural numbers. For examples: 
(i) English: 
—SINGULAR I you, thou he, she, it 
PLURAL we you, thou they 
(ii) French: 
- S I N G U L A R I je tu, vous il, elle 
PLURAL nous vous ils, elles 
(iii) German: 
r 
SINGULAR ich du, Sie er, sie, es : 
PLURAL wir ihr, Ihr ^ 
丨. 
From the viewpoint of linguistics, it is clear that the concept of person is 
different from the concept of subject or subjectivity. The former includes all 
possible relations of oneself to the others, while the later includes only the 
subject or the individual such as "I," "ego," "self," etc. 
Etymological speaking, the word "person" comes from the Latin word 
persona, which is originated from the verb personare, literally meaning "to 
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sound through." The Latin word persona was probably a translation of the 
ancient Greek prosopa, plural of prosopon, which mean faces or masks. In 
ancient Greek dramas, actors and actresses had to speak through the mask when 
they were performing an act. Nowadays, the phrase ”dramatis personae” can 
still be found on the program of a play. 
Boethius explained further the history of persona in De duabus naturis et 
una persona Christi: 
The word person seems to be taken from those persons who represented 
men in comedies and tragedies. For person comes from sounding through 
(personando), since a greater volume of sound is produced through the 
cavity in the mask. These "persons" or masks the Greeks calledprosopa, as 
they were placed on the face and covered the features before the eyes， 
The concept of person is without doubt a vital concept in Jewish-Christian 
theology. Boethius is one of the first theologians who defined the concept of 
person. He explained the concept with the classic definition: persona est naturae 
rationalis individua substantia (person is an individual substance of an rational 
nature).45 By means of intellect, one is able to think and to act by himself. Hence, 
persons are those individuals who are intelligibly mature and can act freely with 
his will. 
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Person is not only an abstract philosophical concept, but it is also rich in 
social and political contents. From a sociological point of view, persons mean 
citizens or freemen, who are distinct from slaves and savages. In other words, to 
be a person is to be socially independent. Nevertheless, personal being does not 
mean exactly the same with social being or political animal. The characteristic of 
person is that only he can act according to his own intellect. In other wordings, 
he must be an acting person with rational nature. In fact, the word "person" was a 
legal term in Roman law, which signifies any individual who is legally 
recognized as the subject of rights and duties, and later to whom holding an 
honour, official or magnate. 
Aquinas also explained the concept of person in details. According to him, 
the Latin word persona has a twofold meaning: First, it is a literal translation of 
the Greek word prosopon. Second, it also means the same as the Greek word 
hypostasis. Person and hypostasis have the same meaning: 
For Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.) that "the Greeks called the individual 
substance of the rational nature by the name hypostasis." But this with us 
signifies "person". Therefore "person" is altogether the same as 
"hypostasis."4^ 
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Many scholars in mediaeval philosophy, Etienne Gilson for example, argues that 
the concept of person is a mediaeval one.47 But this notion was criticizes by de 
Vogel, who argues in the "Preface" to the third volume of Greek Philosophy that 
it is impossible for the Greeks to know nothing about the concept of person. 
Studies have revealed that Panaetius and Plotinus have already known the 
concept of person or personality, although they use the word hypostasis instead 
ofprosopon or personcL你 
Hypostasis is an important philosophical concept, which is from hypo-
(under) and histasthai (to be standing), meaning "standing under". Literally, it 
refers to something settles at the bottom, such as sediment, support or foundation 
of a building. From a philosophical point of view, hypostasis means the 
underlying principle or the real being.49 It means the same with the supreme 
principles of being in later Platonism. In the context of metaphysics, it means 
roughly the same with substance (hypokeimenon, substratum), which is the 
substance or essential nature of an individual. Aristotle explained the meaning of 
substance in Categories, where hypokeimenon is defined as: 
...that which is neither predicable of a subject nor present in a subject, 
whereas substance (pusia) in a secondary sense is the apprehended 
substantial nature or essence of a thing, which, in order to exist, must exist 
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in a subject. This subject necessarily is the concrete, uniquely existing 
individual, for instance, the individual man or h o r s e . � � 
For Aristotle, the first ousia is a hypostasis, meaning "that which stands under" 
all properties and characteristics. However, substantia is easily confused with 
the word subsistentia. Although the Greeks did not use the word persona, they 
made a very important distinction among ousia, esse and hypostasis. Aquinas 
further explained the concept "person" as hypostasis, or the first substance: 
For substance is individualized by itself; whereas the accidents are 
individualized by the subject, which is the substance; since this particular 
whiteness is called "this," because it exists in this particular subject. And so 
it is reasonable that the individuals of the genus substance should have a 
special name of their own; for they are called "hypostases," or first 
substances. "51 
I 
The meaning of hypostasis, subsistance and substance should be carefully 
distinguished with reference to their context. For a better understanding of these 
concepts, one can refer to the following genealogy: 
prosopon hypostasis hypokeimenon ousia 




Person is known as subsistence in the doctrines of Christian theology. In addition, 
the word "Person" means specifically the three modes of being in the Trinity of 
the Christian God. Athanasius, as quoted by Aquinas, writes, "One is the person 
of the Father, another of the Son, another of the Holy Spirit. Aquinas noticed 
there are three persons, and hence there are three subsistences: 
Further, as we say there are three persons in God, so we say there are three 
subsistences in God; which implies that "person" and "subsistence" have the 
same meaning. Therefore "person" and "subsistence" mean the same.^^ 
For Aquinas, God is a personal being with multiple personal acts. The Father, 
and the Son, and the Holy Ghost are three divine persons. Jesus Christ is a 
special person: he is one person, the Son of the eternal Father, and that he has two 
j 
natures, the truly human and the truly divine. 
What is the meaning of one person with two natures? It is a difficult issue 
concerning the concept of "nature". Basically, every being has its own nature. 
For example, a rock has a nature different from that of a cat and a cat has a nature 
different from that of man. However, not everything can be a person. Every 
person has a nature, but it is incorrect to say that every nature has a person. In 
Sacramentum Mundi, it is explained that: 
36 
Person does not mean "essence" or "nature" but the actual unique reality of a 
spiritual being, an undivided whole existing independently and not 
interchangeable with any other. 54 
Person, essence and nature have specific meanings, which should never be 
conceived as the same concept. In the Aquinas lecture of 1993, W. N. Clarke 
explained the same idea that person is not the same as nature: 
Ordinary langauge indicates clearly the distinction by two distinct questions: 
"who am I?" (person) and "what am I?" (nature).^^ 
General speaking, nature is the essence (esse) or form which makes a thing to be 
what it is {quod quid est). It is a response to the question "What is it?" or "What 
am I?" Therefore, nature of a thing is the same as its definition. On the other hand, 
I 
person is a response to the question "Who am I?" The person or the "who" is an 
individual substance (material or immaterial) of an intellectual nature. Recall 
Boethius' definition, no individual substance of a non-intellectual, non-human 
nature can possibly be a person. The meaning of person of an individual 
substance lies in the "human soul," which is the strictest sense of the term. Thus, 
according to Aquinas: 
37 
A companionate dog, no matter how "loyal" or "intelligent" it may be, is in 
no way a person. Even if that dog responds to a name or its master's 
presence or absence, it is not a person. To use the word person of any 
individual substance of a non-intellectual nature is a misuse of the term, 
which cannot be tolerated in philosophy. On the other hand, a group of 
persons may constitute a legal entity known as a corporation or 'moral 
person,’ which may be the subject of legal rights and obligations before the 
law. But this is merely a legitimate extension of a basically sound definition 
of person.56 
Aquinas expressed clearly that the person is that "which is most perfect in all of 
nature."57 Man is a spiritual person, in the sense that every man is unique and 
irreplaceable. 
The concept of person in modem philosophy follows more or less the 
tradition of medieval theology, but it is progressively rationalized into the 
j 
concept of rational person (Vernunftperson). For example, John Locke defined 
1  jf 
the person as "a thinking intelligent being" in his An Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding.^^ The realm of the spiritual and the concept of subsistence are 
restricted to the area of rational thinking or perceiving. However, the modem 
notion of person is at least not a thing. On the European continent, Kant 
emphasizes the difference of a person and a thing (Sachen). In Fundamental 
principle of metaphysics of moral, he writes: 
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Beings the existence of which rests on our will but on nature, if they are 
beings without reason, still have only a relative worth, as means, and are 
therefore called things', whereas rational beings are called persons because 
their nature already marks them out as an end in itself, that is as something 
that may not be used merely as means, and hence so far limits all choice 
(and is an object of respect).^^ 
It is worth notice that Kant emphasizes that a thing is only the mean for a certain 
end, which is replaceable, exchangeable and can be objectified. In contrast, 
person is an end-in-itself who is irreplaceable and enjoys dignity. Every 
individual person should not be objectified into a thing. Person can only be 
understood through empathy and communication. 
Moreover, Kant also regards the person as the transcendental apperception 
(I think). This notion is a re-interpretation of Descartes's notion of ego cogito, I ！ 
\ • 
am a thing that thinks.^^ 
f：' "I 
To sum up, person is always in relationship with other people or other things, 
but he is not an isolated self or individual. Therefore, the concept of person is a 
hint to the relationship of man and other beings, including all human persons and 
the nature. It is related to the question "What is man's place in nature?" 
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II Scheler^s Ethical Personalism 
The concept of ethical person is a main theme in Scheler's Formalism in 
Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values, with a subtitle: A New Attempt towards 
the Foundation of an Ethical Personalism. Concerning the title, first of all, it is 
necessary to clarify the meaning of "non-formal," which is a translation of the 
German adjective material, meaning "with content".^^ One may also say that the 
non-formal ethics is an ethics with content, while formal ethics is an ethics 
without content. 
The two-volume work aims at the evaluation the formalistic ethics and to 
explore the possibilities of non-formal ethics of values and ethical personalism. I 
I 
According to Scheler, Kantian ethics is the best example of all theories of ethical : 
I'： '1 
formalism. The presuppositions (Voraussetzungen) of Kantian formalistic ethics 
include: 
1. Every non-formal ethics must of necessity be an ethics of goods and 
purposes (Guter- und Zweckethik). 
2. Every non-formal ethics is necessarily of only empirical-inductive and 
a posteriori validity. 
3. Every non-formal ethics is of necessity an ethics of success. Only 
formal ethics can treat the basic moral tenor {Gesinnung) or willing 
based upon it as the original bearer of the values of good and evil. 
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4. Every non-formal ethics is of necessity a hedonism and so falls back on 
the existence of sensible states of pleasure, that is, pleasure taken in 
objects. Only formal ethics is in a position to avoid all reference to 
sensible pleasure-states through the exhibition of moral values and the 
proof of moral norms resting on such values. 
5. Every non-formal ethics is of necessity heteronomous. Only formal 
ethics can found and establish the autonomy of the person {die 
Autonomic der Person) 
6. Every non-formal ethics leads to a mere legalism with respect to 
actions. Only formal ethics can found the morality of willing {die 
Moralitdt des Wollens). 
7. Every non-formal ethics makes the person a servant to his own states or 
to alien goods. Only formal ethics is in a position to demonstrate and 
found the dignity of the person {die Wurde der Person). 
8. Every non-formal ethics must of necessity place the ground of all 
ethical value-estimations in the instinctive egoism of man's natural 
organization. Only formal ethics can lay the foundation for a moral law, 
valid in general for all rational beings, which is independent of all 
egoism and every special natural organization of man.62 
I 
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Scheler is discontent with the presuppositions mentioned above. He further | 
•I 
.I 
argues that the Kantian formalism has many misconception and prejudices on ； 
the non-formal ethics. He disagreed with Kant that non-formal ethics is an ethics 
of goods (Giiterethik), an ethics of purposes (Zweckethik), or any empirical 
ethics. It is neither an ethics of success, hedonism or eudaemonism of any kind, 
nor it is an moral theory to be reduced into an ethics of imperative.^^ On the 
contrary, Scheler argues that the non-formal ethics is an ethics of values, which 
can establish the true autonomy of a person. Unlike ethical formalism, non-
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formal ethics does not lead to legalism. Therefore, it will not make the person as 
a servant to his own will or to other alien goods. He emphasizes that the non-
formal ethics is neither an egoism nor an individualism, but a collective 
personalism.64 
From the statements above, one might suggest that Scheler's ethical 
personalism is simply an antithesis of the Kantian ethics. However, this opinion 
is wrong. Ron Perrin is right to argue that the relationship of Kant and Scheler is 
not a case of ’A’ or ’�A.'65 In fact, Scheler has pointed out clearly that he is not 
intended to criticize the "historical Kant" but the "idea of a formal ethics as 
SUCh".66 
Concerning the concept of ethical person, Scheler agreed with Kant's point I 
I 
of departure, i.e., the person is not a thing.^^ Later, he affirmed his position by ；. 
I' 
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claiming that "the person can never be thought as a thing or a substance. 
However, unlike the Kantian tradition, Scheler pointed out that the person must 
never be designated as a mere rational person {Vernunftperson). He disagreed 
with the Kantian notion that the person is conceived as an X, who "is a person 
only through its performing a non-personal rational activity - above all, an 
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activity of practical reason. In fact, the rationalization of person is one of the 
fundamental errors of formal ethics. In Critique of Pure Reason, Kant writes: 
For a power of choice is mere animal (arbitrium brutum) if it cannot be 
determined otherwise than through sensible impulses, i.e., pathologically. 
But the power of choice that can be independently of sensible impulses and 
hence through motivating causes that are presented only by reason is called 
the free power of choice {arbitrium liberum); and everything connected 
with this free power of choice, whether as basis or as consequence, is called 
practical.iQ 
For Kantian ethics, morality cannot be established from empirical sensation or 
experiences, because of the fact that they are a posteriori in nature. The ground 
of moral laws can never be found on the feelable experience. Sensational 
feelings should never be the criteria of any moral choices. That is the reason why 
Kantian moral laws are in the form of categorical imperatives. : 
、丨 
Nevertheless, Scheler argues that the ethical person should never be 
conceived as a mere thinking subject who acts according to his practical reason, 
but a person who is capable of essence-intuition (Wesensschauung) and 
valuation {Wertnehmung)J^ Scheler argues that values such as good and evil are 
non-formal in essence, which can be felt by the ethical person who is able to act, 
to choose and to judge freely. In fact, Scheler claims that one of the errors of 
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ethical formalism is to reduce value-facts into the categories of formal ought or 
duties, especially in the case of Kantian ethics: 
It is Kant's first error to deny that "good" and "evil" are non-formal values. 
But they are - avoiding all construction - clearly feelable non-formal values 
of their own kind7^ 
Scheler claims that values are phenomenological given prior to any formal laws 
or duties. He emphasizes that there is a feelable order of value-ranks or 
preferring, which is the fundamental ground of any non-formal ethics/^ 
According to Scheler, the lowest rank is the sensible and the feelings. The 
second order is the values of vital feeling. The third order is beauty and the 
, i 
spiritual values. Finally, the highest order is the values of the holy and the 
I' I I, !' 
u n h o l y .74 The order of higher or lower is neither empty nor formal in nature, but ：丨 
丨、 
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it can be felt a priori by the ethical person.75 
One must draw special attention to the meaning of feelable {fuhlbare\ 
which is not in the sense of empiricism or other naive mysticism, but in the sense 
of phenomenological perception: 
The value itself always must be intuitively given or must refer back to that 
kind of givenness. Just as it is senseless to ask for the common properties of 
all blue or red things, since they have nothing in common except their 
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blueness or redness, so it is senseless to ask for the common properties of 
good or evil deeds, moral tenors [Gesinnungen], men, etc 
Scheler emphasizes that values do not change with a change in things. For 
example, "redness" does not change even the colour of a red thing fades away. 
However, values are not primordially given as symbols or concepts. One may 
define the colour "red" as an electro-magnetic wave with a particular wavelength 
from the viewpoint of modem physics. But in lived experience, "redness" is 
given simultaneously when we see something red. Value-qualities are given in 
phenomenological intuition (Anschauung), which is asymbolic and non-
mediated. For example, Scheler argues that the special value-qualities of red 
wine are not determined by its chemical components but are given in the unique 
experience of taste 
The same argument is applicable to the concept of Gesinnungen, which is 
translated as "basic moral tenors" or "moral sentiment." Although our life-
experience is always changing, the moral value of basic moral tenors does not 
change. It is enduring, independent and is the principle bearer of the moral 
values within the realm of act-values.？呂 Scheler further explained that the basic 
moral tenor is a non-formal value: 
45 
The basic moral tenors, i.e., the directedness of willing toward a higher (or 
lower) value and its content, contains a non-formal value-quality 
Wertmaterie] that is independent of success, even of all further levels of an 
act of willing. 
For Scheler, non-formal values are a priori given without any increase or 
decrease in their contents. "All attempts to define a priori essences result, 
therefore, in a circulus in definiendo''P Kant is erroneous to equate the concept 
of a priori to the categories of formality, rationality, universality and necessity. 
The parallelism between the formal (formal) and the non-formal {material) is not 
applicable to the parallelism between the concepts of a priori and a posteriori: 
A priori is everything in the given of intuition which belongs to the pure 
what- and essence-sphere, i.e., the primordial notion (Jnbegriff) of such 
essence-determinations (Soseinsbestimmtheiten) of objects (in absence of 
modi of existence) which as Sosein (thisness) are indefinable and which, for 
this reason, are presupposed in every attempt to define them. Such essences 
are, therefore, only "intuitive" [erschaunar)， 
For Scheler, person is defined as the bearer of values (Wertrdger). He argues that 
"only persons can (originally) be morally good or evil; everything else can be 
good or evil by reference to persons, no matter how indirect this ’reference’ may 
be".81 It is clear that non-formal values are given a priori to the person. 
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Moreover, Scheler claims that moral values are not in the concrete moral 
acts, but in the direction of a person's moral "to-be-able-to". This "to-be-able-to" 
precedes any idea of duty.^^ For Scheler, the person is an acting person. He 
writes: 
Person is a concrete unity of all possible acts, the person is outside the entire 
sphere of all possible "objects"…the person is, above all, outside the entire 
sphere of thingness, which is a part of the sphere of objects. The person 
exists solely in the pursuance of his acts.83 
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Ill Person, Community and World 
Scheler's concept of person is further elaborated in part 6 of Formalism in 
Ethics, where he discussed the topic "Formalism and Person". This is divided 
into two sub-parts: In A, Scheler discusses the theoretical conception of the 
person (Person and Reason, Person and Ego, Person and Act), this sub-part can 
be known as a phenomenological analysis of person; In B, Scheler discusses the 
person in ethical c o n t e x t s . 
In this phenomenological analysis of person, Scheler rejects the Kantian 
notion of rational person or practical person, who is merely an X acting some 
kind of practical reasoning. Kant is accused by Scheler that this X (a rational 
moral agent) will never be an independent or an autonomous person, but 
becomes a person of logonomy.^^ Scheler writes: 
Thus the proton pheudos in the definition of the person leads to a false 
alternative: there is either heteronomy of the person through a pure 
logonomy and, indeed, the tendency to complete depersonalization, or the 
ethical individualism of living one's life without any inner limits on its 
rights. But the recognition of a spiritual person and individuality, which 
alone can prevent such mistakes, is at once completely precluded by this 
system， 
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According to Kant, the ethical person is only a moral will, who acts according to 
moral law only. Scheler argues that it can never become an autonomous person 
but a person of logonomy. Furthermore, this Kantian notion of X is only a homo 
noumenon, which is just as unconceivable as any other kinds of "thing-in-itself, 
in the world of noumenon. As we have no means to know the "thing-in-itself ’， 
hence it is impossible for us to understand this miserable X as a person with 
dignity and autonomy. ^ ^ 
Person should neither be reduced to homo noumenon, nor be reduced to the 
logical subject of transcendental apperception. Scheler strongly disagrees with 
Kant who objectifies the ego of perception into a mere idea of "thinking I" 
{cogito) or "consciousness in general". On the contrary, Scheler follows the 
phenomenological discovery that the ego of an individual is co-given with a 
lived-body. The person of the ethical personalism is always a b o d y - e g o， 
Scheler argues that the lived body {der Leib) is given as a total unity and is prior 
to the thing-body {der Korper), which is the biological body of a man including 
head, hand, stomach, etc， 
From the perspective of ethical personalism, there are no problems of 
solipsism or subjectivity. It is because the concept of person does not presuppose 
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an egological condition of the world.^^ Scheler accuses Kant that he conceives 
the world as an idea.9i For Scheler, world is not an idea but is pre-given or pre-
connected with the person. The relationship between the lived body and the 
environment (Unwelt) is never to be conceived as a subject-object dichotomy. 
He argues: 
...the person is never a "part" of a world; the person is always the correlate 
of a "world," namely, the world in which he experiences himself.^^ 
Person is regards as the correlate (Sachkorrelat) of a world, which means he is 
always co-existing with the world. Unlike the tradition of subjectivism, the 
relationship between person and world should never be conceived as a 
relationship between a subject of cognition to an "outer world". It is wrong to 
regard the world as a mere object or a simple idea. Rather, it is given as a milieu 
Qiyle) to us. The world is the environmental setting for the person. Therefore, 
one may say that the personal being is a "person-in-the-world. 
Scheler further differentiates the concept of person into individual person 
(Einzelperson) and common person (Gesamtperson), From the viewpoint of 
ethical personalism, every individual person is a unique being with unique 
values, who should never be reduced into a thing or an object. In Scheler's words, 
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it is always a person who "belongs to the essence of the person to exist and to live 
solely in the execution of intentional acts. The person is therefore essentially 
never an 'object'. 
The individual person corresponds to a microcosm, which is a peculiar 
world that cannot be reduced into a universal idea of world. Scheler is also aware 
of a macrocosm, which is not the world of any individual person, but the world 
of collective person (Gesamtperson). For the collective person always correlates 
with the unity of the world. This unity of the world, or so-called macrocosm, is 
co-given with God. The God in this sense should never be reduced into a mere 
transcendent idea. God is a personal being. Scheler emphaszies: 
...every "unity of the world" (including all kinds of monism and pantheism) 
without regress to the essence of a personal "God," be it a "universal world 
reason" a "transcendental rational ego," a "moral governor of the world" \ 
(Kant), and ordo ordinans (Fichte in his earlier period), an infinite logical 
"subject" (Hegel), or an impersonal or self-styled "suprapersonal 
unconscious," etc., is an "absurd" philosophical assumption.^^ 
Many philosophers have tried to substitute the reality of the personal God by 
different kinds of philosophical ideas or concepts. But these attempts will never 
be fruitful, since God is a personal being rather than an abstract idea. In his 
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earlier essay "On the Idea of Man," Scheler has pointed out that one of the main 
errors of modem philosophy is that man creates a God by himself: 
Probably the silliest thing which the "modems" have concocted is the 
opinion that the idea of God is an "anthropomorphism". This is false even to 
the extent that one must hold conversely that a unique meaningful idea of 
"man" is an absolute "theo-morphism," the idea of an X which is a finite and 
living image of God, a simile of his - one of his innumerable shadows on the 
great wall of being! 97 
Besides, Scheler argues that the person is a social being (Gemeinschaftswesen). 
His notion of soziale Person is similar to Aristotle's formulation: man as zoon 
politikon. The person is social because he is not living alone in the world. On the 
other hand, he is always in connection with a community. 
From the viewpoint of ethical personalism, it is impossible to think of an 
absolute ego. In ordinary language, the word person is always in a relationship 
with "thou," "we," "they," etc. The concept of "I" is essentially correlated to "the 
others，’，Scheler argues that the being o f person i s a being-self and a be ing -wi th 
�Mit-sein)•明 Therefore, the person "we," who are the "I" co-given with "thou," is 
actually prior to the concept of ego. 
In fact, Scheler is concerned with the relationship between man and his 
community. Ernest Ranly suggests an explanation: 
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For Scheler, the line between philosophical anthropology and sociology 
was very thin. Since man is other-oriented in his most original experiences, 
since man is social prior to being individual, the study of man necessarily 
and intrinsically includes the study of the social nature of man.ioo 
Scheler has written many sociological and political writings on the issue of man. 
His theory of sociology is closely related to his philosophical anthropology, 
especially the studies of feelings or emotions of man, such as ressentiment, 
sympathy and love. Scheler's philosophy of feelings, especially the 
phenomenology of love and hatred, will be discussed in the coming chapter. 
To sum up, Scheler's notion of ethical person is not a mere moral agent. The 
person is a bearer of values who has an inseparable relationship with the world, 
the community. The content of ethical person is in fact more than that of a moral 
soul or a practical reason. Kant claims in the Critique of Pure Reason that 
"intuitions without concepts are blind, thoughts without contents are empty. ’！⑴ 
A Schelerian might argue that a rational morality without value-perception is in 
fact blind and empty. The traditional dichotomy of reason (Vernunft) and 
sensibility {Sinnlichkeit), presupposed in many philosophical theories of man 
and person, should no longer be accepted unconditionally. 
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Chapter Three Scheler's Concept of Man 
"What is man?" and "What is man's place in being?" are two fundamental 
concerns of Scheler. In chapter two, it has been revealed that the man is a 
personal being, who is not alone in the world. Person is always in a network of 
relationships with other persons. It is clear that the person is a social animal, for 
the person "I" is always facing "thou," "we," "they," etc. 
Another central thesis of Scheler's philosophical anthropology is that the 
personal being should never be regards as a pure rational animal. A man without 
feelings, such as love, hatred, ressentiment, sympathy, etc., is completely 
incomprehensible. 
However, is there an essential difference between man and other animals? 
What is the essence of a personal being? It is now necessary to account for 
Scheler's concept of the essence of man. However, before proceeding into the 
discussion of Scheler's concept of man, the following section will be a 
preparative discussion on the different concepts of man in the context of history 
of philosophy. 
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I On the Concepts of Man 
One of the objects of our investigation is the concept of man. "What is 
meant by the concept of man?" In order to answer this question, it is customary 
to give a definition to the concept, i.e. to account for the essence {essentia) of 
man. 
The concept of man can be defined from two perspectives: First, when it is 
singular in number, "man" usually stands for any particular male member of the 
animal called Homo sapiens, from the biological family Hominidae. In other 
cases "man" may refer to any male or female member of Homo sapiens, 
depending on the context. Second, when in plural sense, which is rendered as 
"men," it means mankind in general, all human members or races. : 
；I 
Homo sapiens, which means "man the wise," is the prevailing concept of 
man. It is divided into two parts: Homo the genus and sapiens the s p e c i e s . 1 0 2 A 
detail description of the characteristics of Homo sapiens can be found in 
Encyclopcedia Britannica: 
Homo sapiens is distinguished from other animals and from earlier hominid 
species by characteristics and habits such as bipedal stance and gait, brain 
capacity averaging about 1,350 cubic cm (82 cubic inches), high forehead, 
small teeth and jaw, defined chin, construction and use of tools, and ability 
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to make use of symbols such as language and writing. Some of these 
features were possessed by the immediate ancestor, Homo erectus\ but in 
the aggregate they are characteristic only of Homo sapiens 
According to fossil records and evolution theories, there were many species of 
Homo in the past, including Homo habilis, Homo erectus and Homo sapiens 
archaic. However, only Homo sapiens sapiens, which is the latest species in the 
history of evolution, still exists today. Darwin was not the first one to propose 
evolution theories, but he was the first scientist to explain evolution by the 
concept of survival of the fittest or natural selection. The framework of Darwin's 
original hypothesis is still accepted today.刚 
Recent research has shown that man and some animals of the same family, 
such as chimpanzees, are similar in many aspects. A question of man rises: "Is 
there still a difference between man and other animals?" 
Homo sapiens is only a biological concept of man, but this notion has 
monopolized the discussion on the problem of man for many years. However, it 
is clear that there are other concepts of man. From the viewpoint of philosophical 
anthropology, man is more than a biological being {Homo biologicus). Max 
Scheler suggests that there are three basic concepts of man in the western 
tradition: 
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The first is the Jewish-Christian tradition of Adam and Eve including 
creation, paradise and fall. The second is the Greek tradition in which, for 
the first time, man's self-consciousness raised him to a unique place on the 
grounds that he is endowed with "reason". Closely bound up with this view 
is the doctrine that there is a superhuman "reason" in the total universe in 
which man alone of all creatures participates. The third idea is that of 
modem science and genetic psychology, which also has a tradition of its 
own. According to this view, man is a very recent product of evolution on 
our planet, a creature distinguished from its antecedents in the animal world 
only by the degree of complexity of energies and capacities already present 
on a subhuman level.肥 
It is impossible to discuss all the topics above in this thesis. For the sake of 
discussion, however, the various concepts mentioned above will be rearranged 
under three categories, namely, the concepts of man in ancient philosophy, ‘ 




(i) The concepts of man in ancient philosophy 
Clear enough, Scheler is not the first person who reflects on the problems of 
man. In fact, throughout the history of western philosophy, philosophers from 
different cultural backgrounds have devoted themselves to a common project, 
that is to search for the essence of man. Although philosophical anthropology 
was a movement in 19th century, the philosophy of man has already begun in 
Ancient Hellenistic period. 
It is worth noticed that the concepts of man during this period are not 
restricted to the field of philosophy only but also in tragedies and paintings. In 
Homer's Iliad, the most common word meaning man is not anthropos but 
thnetos, which means " m o r t a l . " � 0 6 
Ancient philosophy before Socrates has already contributed many insights 
to the problem of man. Sophocles praises man as a being who has the ability to 
use language.Herodotus is regards as the "father" of anthropology. He has 
invented the concept of c u l t u r e . T h e main concern of Hellenistic anthropology 
is to account for the differences between the Hellenistic man or the Greeks 
{EUeues), and the barbarians (barbaroi). The problem of man is indispensably 
related to the problem of race.!�') Anaxagoras, another pre-Socratic philosopher, 
58 
is concerned with man's ability to manipulate in a skillful manner to serve his 
purpose. He asks, "man has hands because it is useful, or it is useful so that he 
has hands?"uo It should be reminded that there was an ancient version of 
evolution theory in Anaximander's works: "Man was produced in the first 
instance from animals of a different s o r t . " � The sophists have also proposed 
many theories on man. One of the best formulations is from Protagoras, who 
regards man as the measure of all things. 
For Plato, the greatest philosopher among the ancient Greeks, anthropology 
is associated with his dualistic structure of man, which is composed of body and 
soul. A radical antithesis between body and soul can be found in many Platonic 
dialogues. In Phaedo, Plato explained the immortality of the soul and condemns 
the body as a tomb in detail. This leads to the notion of soma-sema, which means : 
"the body a tomb". The soma-sema formula is well known among scholars from 
both philosophical and theological disciplines. Platonic dualism reflects a 
dualistic anthropological standpoint: man has two parts, the perishable body and 
the immortal soul. The former one is the obstacle for a person to know the 
ultimate truth. Therefore, only an uncontaminated soul is able to understand the 
true reality. 
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The difference between the true reality and untrue opinion is further 
elaborated with the introduction of a divided line in the Republic, where Plato 
explained the division of knowledge {episteme) and opinion (doxa). Knowledge 
is further subdivided into intelligence {noesis) and mathematical thinking 
(dianoia). Likewise, opinion is subdivided into belief (pistis) and illusion 
(eikasia). The four kinds of cognition form an order of value: intelligence is 
more preferable than mathematical thinking and so on, with illusion the least 
value. The essence of man is not the body but the soul, which is an immaterial 
entity capable of dialectical reasoning. 
This dualistic view of human understanding corresponds to Plato's famous 
dualistic cosmology: there are two worlds, the world of phenomenon and the 
world of noumenon. The world of phenomenon refers to the visible sensible ‘ 
realm Qioraton) and the world of noumenon to the invisible intelligible realm 
( n o e t o n ) . m xhe former is not the primary reality but a mere world of 
appearances, or phenomenal manifestations. The latter is a world of timeless and 
unchanging reality, which is an immaterial realm o f F o r m s . � 
However, there is a legitimated question to be answered: "Is Platonism a 
dualism?" Are body and soul two separable entities? Are there really two worlds? 
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According to de Vogel, Plato never speaks of two realities. De Vogel reads in 
Timaeus that the mature Plato defines man as a sunamphoteron, a "both-
together," which means a union of body and soul. Even as early as in Crito, Plato 
has claims that life is still not worth living if the body is in a bad condition, 
although the soul is said to be superior than the body elsewhere. Moreover, from 
a cosmological point of view, the world of phenomenon and the world of 
noumenon cannot exist independently. They are not two separable beings or 
realities. It is suggested that the so-called dualistic elements of Plato are more or 
less under the influences of Christian theology or Cartesian d u a l i s m . 
The best formulation of man in ancient Greek philosophy can be found in 
Aristotle's Politics, in which he defines man as zoon politikon, for man alone is 
capable of intelligence or reasoning {logon de monon anthrdpos echei ton 
八• /A \ 
zoion): 
And why man is a political animal in a greater measure than any bee or any 
gregarious animal is clear. For nature, as we declare, does nothing without 
purpose; and man alone of the animals possesses speech. The mere voice, it 
is true, can indicate pain and pleasure, and therefore is possessed by the 
other animals as well (for their nature has been developed so far as to have 
sensations of what is painful and pleasant and to indicate those sensations to 
one another), but speech is designed to indicate the advantageous and the 
harmful, and therefore also the right and the wrong; for it is the special 
property of man in distinction from the other animals that he alone has 
perception of good and bad and right and wrong and the other moral 
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qualities, and it is partnership in these things that makes a household and a 
city-state. 115 
Aristotle did not claim that man is the only being possessing the power of reason. 
Gods also possess logos, but they are not social beings. He argues that only man 
can make use of his reasoning to establish a city-state, which is a community of 
persons. Therefore, zoon logistikon and zoon politikon are two basic concepts of 
man. 
Aristotle also explained the essence of zoon logistikon in On the Soul. He 
compared the psychic powers in different living organisms and notices that there 
are nutritive soul, appetitive soul, sensory soul, locomotive soul and the 
intelligible soul. He concluded that only man possesses the intellectual soul, 
w h i c h is t he centre o f l anguage , reasoning and j u d g e m e n t . 
The Aristotelian concept of logos does not merely mean the ability of 
rational thinking, but the ability of speech. By means of speech, man is able to 
articulate his thought theoretically and to make teleological argumentation as 
well as technical calculation.丄口 In addition, man can make use of his phronesis 
or practical wisdom to distinguish good or evil, and t o archive h a p p i n e s s . 
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(ii) The concepts of man in medieval theology 
Aristolte's notion of man as zoon logistikon is influential in the making of 
the medieval conception of man. In fact, Seneca translated literally the 
Aristotelian notion of zoon logistikon into animal rationalisHowever, 
"rational animal" is a misleading concept. It should be pointed out that Aristotle's 
concept of logos has a wider dimension than the "reason" or "rationality" in the 
modem terminology. 12� 
Apart from the influences from Hellenistic philosophy, the problem of man 
is also a major concern in the Jewish-Christian tradition. One may find that there 
are also many concepts of man in the Bible. 
In the Christian doctrine, God creates man in the sixth day of Genesis. Like 
other creatures, man is subjected to natural laws and order. But unlike the others, 
man is given the authority over the earth and its inhabitants: 
And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness: and let 
them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and 
over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that 
creepeth upon the earth. So God created man in his [own] image, in the 
image of God created he him; male and female created he t h e m . � 
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Man is a special creature in the world: man is God's image {imago Dei). 
However, the first image of God is a male (Adam). Woman (Eve) was later 
created from the ribs of Adam. This is one source of the masculinity of man in 
the West: 
And the Lord God caused a deep sleep to fall upon Adam, and he slept: and 
he took one of his ribs, and closed up the flesh instead thereof; And the rib, 
which the Lord God had taken from man, made he a woman, and brought 
her unto the man. And Adam said, This [is] now bone of my bones, and 
flesh of my flesh: she shall be called Woman, because she was taken out of 
Man.m 
Man and woman are different from other creatures that only they have the 
resemblance of God. Medieval theologians tried to place man in between the 
divine God and other creations. Their concepts of man is best explained by 
Aquinas, who regards man as a being resembling God for his spiritual nature: 
We speak of a resemblance which is an image of God in human nature in so 
for as the latter has a capacity of God; I am speaking of man's own operation 
of knowledge and love {pperatione cognitionis et amorisY^^ 
Since the Fall, Adam and Eve were subjected to the categories of sin, shame and 
death. Man was expelled from the Garden of Eden and had to decide good and 
evil by himself. However, through his faith in God, man can return to God and 
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participate in an eternal life in the Heaven. In this sense, man is homo peccans et 
redivivus, which means "man who falls and wants to be put up". 
This special relationship between man and the God is called religion, which 
is a linking of man on one side and God on the other. In this sense, man is known 
as homo viator (man the traveller), who is on his way to the destination of 
returning to God. Besides, man is homo negans et patiens, for man has a capacity 
of endurance, patience and suffering. 
(iii) The concepts of man in modern philosophy 
The modem discourse on man begins from Renaissance of 15th century. 
Renaissance means "re-birth," for it is a humanistic movement to re-think the 
dignity and excellence of man. One of the most important humanists at that time 
is Giovanni Pico della Mirandola. In his influential work De hominis dignitate 
oratio {Oration on the Dignity of Man, 1486), he thinks that the Renaissance 
man is radically different from the tradition concepts of man, for man has 
realized his ability to know the world. Man is distinguished from other creations 
that he has been created without form. Only man has the ability to make of 
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himself from what he wills. In this sense, man can overcome his constrains, fate 
or any pre-determined destiny by h imse l f . 124 
In the age of Renaissance, man became to re-think the essence of man 
beyond the Christian doctrines. Rene Descartes (1596-1650), the well-known 
father of modem western philosophy, reflected seriously on the issue. One of his 
early works, De homine (1633), was a philosophical treatise on man.^^^ However, 
Descartes suppressed this treatise because he expected a similar fate of Galileo if 
the controversial work was published. 
While Descartes was famous for his search for the Archimedes' point in 
philosophy, his published works contain a great deal of interests in the study of 
man. In Part Five of Discourse on Method, Descartes tried in a scientific manner 
to answer the question of the essence of man by introducing two criteria to 
distinguish man from other irrational animals or machines. 
The first is that they could never use words, or put together other signs, as 
we do in order to declare our thoughts to others. For we can certainly 
conceive of a machine so constructed that it utters words, and even utters 
words which correspond to bodily actions causing a change in its organs 
(e.g. if you touch it in one spot it asks what you want of it, if you touch it in 
another it cries out that you are hurting it, and so on). But it is not 
conceivable that such a machine should produce different arrangements of 
words so as to give an appropriately meaningful answer to whatever is said 
in its presence, as the dullest of men can so. Secondly, even though such 
machines might do some things as well as we do them, or perhaps even 
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better, they would inevitably fail in others, which would reveal that they 
were acting not through understanding but only from the disposition of their 
organs. For whereas reason is a universal instrument which can be used in 
all kinds of situations, theses organs need some particular disposition for 
each particular action; hence it is for all practical purposes impossible for a 
machine to have enough different organs to make it act in all the 
contingencies of life in the way in which our reason makes us act. 126 
Descartes concludes that even many irrational animals have their own 
advantages, only man possesses the power of language in order to make thoughts 
understood, to communicate thoughts with others and to act from knowledge. He 
argues that "magpies and parrots can utter words as we do, and yet they cannot 
speak as we do: that is, they cannot show that they are thinking what they are 
saying. "127 
With respect to the composition of man, Descartes proposed a dualistic 
structure, which is composed of mind and soul. In Meditations, Descartes 
defined man as the unity of res cogitans and res externa. But he argues that the 
former is a clear and distinct concept. The essence of ego lies in his cogito. 
Descartes writes: 
What am I? A thing that thinks. What is a thing that thinks? It is a thing 
which doubts, understands (conceives), affirms, denies, wills, refuses, 
which also imagines and feels. Certainly it is no small matter if all these 
things pertain in my nature.^^^ 
67 
Mind {res cogitans) and body {res extensa) are two entities with different 
functions. However, the body is perishable while the mind is immortal: 
Soul is of a nature wholly independent of the body, and that consequently it 
is not liable to die with the latter and, finally, because no other causes are 
observed capable of destroying it, we are naturally led thence to judge that it 
is immortal. 129 
For Descartes, however, mind and body are not two incommensurable entities. 
One can even find that Descartes emphasizes the importance of the union of the 
two. He argues: 
. . . i t is not sufficient that it to be lodged in the human body like a helmsman 
in his ship, except perhaps to move its limbs, but that it must be more 
closely joined and united with the body in order to have, besides this power 
of movements, feelings and appetites like ours and so constitute a real 
man. 130 
The so-called real man is a co-operation of the sailors and the captain in a ship. 
For Descartes, the soul is lumiere naturelle, which can be interpreted as a 
modem version of logos. 
Modem discourses on metaphysics and philosophical anthropology are 
significantly influenced by Descartes' definition of man. Nowadays, many 
philosophical debates are related to the "mind and body" problem. In fact, there 
68 
are many objections against the Cartesian philosophy, especially the application 
of geometrical method on the study of man. However, both the Cartesians and 
the anti-Cartesians agreed the fact that Vetude de Vhomme (the study of man) is 
the proper theme of philosophy. 
Blaise Pascal (1623-1662), for instance, strongly disagreed with Descartes 
in many aspects. But he emphasizes that man should not neglect the study of 
man. 131 With his true insight and sensitivity, Pascal regards man as "the most 
feeble thing in nature; but he is a thinking r e e d . … 3 2 He writes: 
I can well conceive a man without hands, feet, head (for it is only experience 
which teaches us that the head is more necessary than feet). But I cannot 
conceive man without thought; he would be a stone or a brute. ^ ^^  
For Pascal, man is homo duplex: there are ordre de la raison, logique de la 
mis on on one side, and ordre du coeur, logique du coeur and raison du coeur on 
the o t h e r . 134 There is always a conflict between the logic of reason and the logic 
of heart. 
Immanuel Kant, in the age of Enlightenment, also writes some important 
works of modem anthropology. He noticed that there are the presence of love, 
values, and insights in man, and man is necessary in relationships with others.^^^ 
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He also claims that only the enlightened man is capable of self-realization, self-
clarification and being autonomous in moral decision. 
From the viewpoints of naturalism, man is homo mechanicus (Thomme 
machine) et physic aliens. According to the empiricists such as John Locke, man 
is only a homo sensitivus who can only know the world through his sensation. 
The positivists and pragmatists propose some other concepts of man, such as 
homo faher et intelligens (for example, Bergson's notion of man as "tool-
animal"). As a matter of fact, man has become a fabricator in the modem world 
after industrial evolution and economic growth. Under the climate of capitalism, 
man is better known as homo oeconomicus or homo capitalisticus, whose 
purpose is to accumulate capital. 
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II Man as ens amans 
For Scheler, man is a person with reason as well as feelings, especially the 
feeling of love and hatred. He regards man as ens amans, a loving being. In this 
section, Scheler's philosophy of love will be discussed with emphases on the 
phenomenology of feelings or the so-called emotional apriorism. 
As a matter of fact, Scheler was interested in the study of the feelings of man, 
especially the phenomena of ressentiment, sympathy, love and hatred. Of these 
feelings, the most essential one is love. For Scheler, love is the essence of man. 
Scheler's philosophy of love is based on his phenomenological study of 
feelings. His first philosophical analysis of feeling is about the phenomenon of 
ressentiment. As early as in 1912, Scheler has written an article "Uber 
Ressentiment und moralisches Werturteil" which was enlarged and published as 
Das Ressentiment im Aufbau der Moralen three years later. 
Ressentiment is a French noun originated from the verb ressentir, which 
means the feeling of being powerless to express feelings directly. The 
corresponding word in English is "resentment," which is seldom used in 
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everyday conversation. In the German language, there is no literal translation of 
the French word and the noun das Res sentiment is adopted directly. 
The philosophy of ressentiment is introduced and discussed in Germany by 
Friedrich Nietzsche, who studied the phenomenon of ressentiment in his famous 
work, Zur Genealogie der Moral (1887).^^^ Scheler's theory of ressentiment is 
indubitably based on the impressive analysis from Nietzsche. 
From Scheler's analysis of ressentiment, there are several fundamental 
characteristics of the phenomenon: First, it is an emotional response against 
someone or something, but the object of ressentiment is not necessary an 
individual. It can also be a collective idea such as mankind or a universal concept 
such as the whole world. 
Second, ressentiment is always a negative feeling against the object. This 
negative feeling usually comes from envy or the desire for revenge. At this point, 
Scheler suggests that the German word GroU (which is "grudge" in English) is 
similar to the concept of ressentiment. 
Third, this special negative feeling against someone is not an impulsive 
reaction. Conversely, ressentiment is a prolonged reaction and usually increases 
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with time. In some cases, the feeling of res sentiment may even last for a lifetime, 
and the magnitude of the ressentiment can be accumulated enormously. 
The fourth characteristic is the most essential one for ressentiment. For a 
person who has the feeling of ressentiment, he has always a thirst for revenge. 
But this feeling is always unexpressed and there is no actual revenge taking place. 
Ressentiment is non-aggressive in nature. Scheler argues: 
Ressentiment can only arise if these emotions are particularly powerful and 
yet must be suppressed because they are coupled with the feeling that one is 
unable to act them out”？ 
The feeling of ressentiment is co-given with the feeling of impotence 
(Ohnmacht). Therefore, if the negative feeling is expressed explicitly, or an 
actual revenge is taken place, the feeling is no longer a ressentiment in any 
manner. In most cases, the feeling is changed into hatred, malignity (JBosheif), 
enviousness (Scheelsucht) or malice (Hdmischkeit). After an actual revenge, the 
feeling of ressentiment may fade away and one may have a feeling of relieve. 
According to Scheler's analysis, the feeling of ressentiment is commonly found 
in priest, who is stereotyped as a peaceful figure and is not allowed to express his 
emotions through hatred, revenge or envy.!38 
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In addition to the general characteristics of ressentiment, one may also 
distinguish two types of ressentiment, the apostate type and the romantic type. 
The former simply negates the past and the latter praises the past. The first type 
of ressentiment can be found in modem philosophers such as Descartes and 
Hegel, who thought that the tradition is erroneous or incomplete. On the other 
hand, the second type of ressentiment is common in those who are deeply 
nostalgic, such as Holderlin and Schlegel. In other words, they are not satisfied 
with the present situation and think that the only solution is back to the past. 139 
Scheler agreed with Nietzsche that ressentiment is an important concept in 
the making of moral philosophy or ethics, because the feeling of ressentiment is 
a strong falsification to the existing moral values and moral judgments. For 
Scheler, ressentiment is fundamentally a "falsification of the value tablets" 
which makes a man "sublime": a ressentiment man negates the established 
system of values, which results in a reversal of values of the dominant morality: 
The value Judgement is based on this original "falsification". It is itself 
entirely "true," "genuine," and "honest," for the value it affirms is really felt 
to be positive. 14G 
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Nietzsche is right to say that ressentiment is influential in the formation of many 
kinds of moralities, but Scheler argues that Nietzsche is completely mistaken in 
his analysis of Christian ethics and Christian love. Scheler disagreed with 
Nietzsche's notion that Christian love is the "flower of ressentiment." 
Conversely, Scheler claims that the core of Christian morality is the notion of 
love, i.e. Agape or Caritas, which is related to the concept of ressentiment. 
Scheler distinguished Christian love and other kinds of love, such as eros 
and philia of the Greeks and amor of Romans. The Hellenistic concept of love is 
a methodos, an upward urge to the ultimate Good. Scheler writes: 
All ancient philosophers, poets, and moralists agree that love is a striving, 
an aspiration of the "lower" towards the "higher," the "unformed" to the 
"formed," the "me on'' towards the "•，" "appearance" towards "essence," 
"ignorance" towards "knowledge," a "mean between fullness and 
privation," as Plato says in Symposium 
But the Christian concept of love is a reversal of the Hellenistic concept. Agape 
is a downward movement, from a higher level to the lower. It is a feeling of 
sympathy from the perfect being to the other beings. Scheler writes: 
On the contrary, now the criterion of love is that the nobler stoops to the 
vulgar, the healthy to the sick, the rich to the poor, the handsome to the ugly, 
the good and saintly to the bad and common, the Messiah to the sinners and 
publicans. 142 
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The positions of a metaphysical god and the Christian God are totally different. 
The former one is a mere idea, "an unmoved mover," which is the ultimate 
source of values. Conversely, the latter is neither an idea nor a first mover. 
Rather he is the highest being or the Creator, who is a personal God loving all 
beings. Therefore, love is an action of the Good. Scheler writes: 
Love itself is the highest of all goods! The summum bonum is no longer the 
value of a thing, but of an act, the value of love itself as love - not for results 
and achievements. Indeed, the achievements of loves are only symbols and 
proofs of its presence in the person. And thus God becomes a "person" who 
has "idea of the Good," no "form and order," no logos above him, but only 
below him - through his deed o f l o v e . � 
The metaphysical God is fundamentally different from the personal God. The 
former God is the ultimate Being, who possesses the truth, the good and the 
reality. This metaphysical God can be represented as the concept of the One. 
However, Christian God is not a metaphysical concept. He is a personal being 
with a superabundance of love. God is always in the universal act of love. In 
addition, all beings are worthy of God's love, including one's friends, neighbours, 
strangers or even enemies, no matter good person or bad persons they are. The 
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central idea of Christian ethics is the love of enemies, which is best expressed in 
Luke 6: 27-31: 
But I say to you that hear, love your enemies, do good to those who hatred 
you, bless those who curse you, and pray for those who abuse you. To him 
who strikes you on the cheek, offer the other also; and from him who take 
away your coat do not withhold even your shirt. Give to every one who begs 
from you; and of him who takes away your goods do not ask them again. 
And as you wish that men would do to you, do so to them.i^^ 
Scheler's study of ressentiment can be summarized in the following points: 
Christian morality is by no means an ethics of ressentiment. Although elements 
of ressentiment and hatred exist in the Jewish mind, the essence of Christian 
morality is the Christian love. Therefore, Scheler claims, ”the root of Christian 
love is entirely free of res sentiment.” 仏 ^  Through the analysis of ressentiment, 
Scheler is recognized as the "Catholic N i e t z s c h e . " i 4 6 
Since love is the act between the personal beings such as man and God, it is 
necessary a "com-passion" or a "sym-pathy" between persons. In fact, sympathy 
is another important concept in Scheler's phenomenology of feeling. One year 
after the release of the essay on ressentiment, Scheler writes another important 
essay, "Zur Phanomenologie der Sympathiegefiihle und vom Liebe und Hass". 
This essay was later published as Wesen und Formen der Sympathie in 1923. 
77 
Etymologically speaking, ”Sympathie” is from the Greek words sym- and 
pathos, which means "feeling with". In English, sympathy can also mean 
compassion or "fellow-feelings," while it can be expressed as Mitgefilhl or 
Sympathiegefuhle in the German language.^^^ 
For Scheler, feelings such as sympathy, ressentiment and love are unique 
phenomena of man, which cannot be reduced to any rational activities. However, 
the discussion of these feelings (Fiihlen) presupposes an understanding of 
different kinds of feeling-states {Gefuhl). For example, pain as a feeling (Fiihlen) 
can be felt, but the feeling-state {Gefuhl) of pain cannot be felt directly. 
Feeling-states are the basic structures of feelings of a person. In Formalism in 
Ethics, Scheler distinguishes different types of feeling-state, which can be 
summarized into four categories as written below:�48 
1. Physical feeling-states, e.g. pain, sensation of tickling, itching, etc. 
2. Vital feeling-states, e.g. weakness, anxiety, illness, health, etc. 
3. Psychic feeling-states, e.g. sorrow, joy, sadness, melancholy (Wehmut), etc. 
4. Spiritual feeling-states of person, e.g. blissfulness, despair, pangs of 
conscience, security (Geborgenheit), peace, etc. 
78 
Of these feelings, physical feeling-states are the most fundamental ones. For all 
physical feeling-states are physiological in nature, which are extended and 
l o c a l i z e d . 149 These feeling-states cannot be generated without an external 
stimulation. They are felt almost-immediately when the body is stimulated. 
Physical feeling-states are sensible in nature and their extension increases with 
intensity. These feeling-states are the object of investigation in the fields of 
medical science by means of scientific observation and measurements. 
Vital feeling-states are something different. Scheler claims that these 
feeling-states are non-extended and non-localized. However, they are more 
significant than the mere physical feelings. For example, in the feeling of itching, 
one may just be annoyed for a while without any affect on his life. But during a 
vital feeling-states such as anxiety, there may be a severe affect on one's mental 
and physiological healthiness. In a state of vital feelings, one can even feel his 
life itself. For example, during a severe illness or injury, one can actually feel an 
increase in vitality, which is in fact a result of a strong vital-feeling.^^^ 
In distinguishing physical feeling-states and vital feeling-states, Scheler 
held that man is more than a biomechanical being, since bio-mechanism cannot 
explain the phenomenon of vital feeling-states. 
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Scheler argues that physical and vital feeling-states are only within the 
subject of feeling, but psychic and spiritual feeling-states can be reproduced and 
shared by other persons. At the level of psychic feeling-states, it is usually a state 
of deep sorrow, usually expressed as "I feel sad (Jch fuhle mich traurig\” "I feel 
sadness (Ich fuhle Trauer\��"I am sad (Jch bin tmurig):� By these expressions, 
one may understand the feelings of another person. Scheler notices that an 
increasing proximity to the ego is found in the above expressions. This feeling is 
the origin of the ego-quality of a person. ^ ^^  
On the other hand, spiritual feeling-state is characterised by the absence of 
ego-ness. These spiritual feelings, such as bliss and despair, are related to the 
personal act of sympathy, which is a feeling of self-less or ego-less. Scheler 
suggests that: 
We can then only "be” blissful or in despair. We cannot, in the strict sense of 
the word, "feel" bliss or despair, nor can we even feel "ourselves" to be 
blissful or in despair. ^ ^^  
For the person who is in the spiritual feeling-state, it is not usual to have 
expressions such as "I feel despair" because the self or the ego is missing. In The 
Nature of Sympathy, Scheler identified four kinds of feeling-states: vicarious 
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feeling, fellow-feeling, benevolence and non-cosmic personal love .�54 It is clear 
that all these different kinds of feeling-states are equally important, which can 
never be further reduced or eliminated. But among these feeling-states, 
sympathy or fellow-feeling is a vital one for all personal beings, since it is the 
origin of the phenomenon of love. 
According to Scheler, sympathy is neither a physical feeling-state nor a 
psychic feeling-state. It is because sympathy is neither empirical in nature nor a 
physiological response of the body. In physical feeling-states, the feelings can 
only be felt by a particular subject. Therefore, it is impossible for us, for example, 
to "feel" the pain or itching of another person. 
On the other hand, sympathy is a spiritual feeling state among personal 
beings. The persons in the state of sympathy become completely transparent and 
opened themselves to each other. Therefore, one can actually feel the unique life 
or lived experience of another person through the act of sympathy. 
Scheler suggests there is an ethics of sympathy. One can understand the 
order of values of a person when they become "sympathetic" with each other. 
Sympathy, through the act of love, becomes a mean of value perception. In the 
feeling of sympathy, one can understand the values of a particular person, but he 
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can also feel the values of other social realities, such as the sphere of the absolute, 
the holy and the sphere of Mitwelt (with-world). In the Mitwelt, the person is not 
a single existence but the unity of person in a community. In sympathy, it is 
revealed that "I and thou" (i.e. "we.") is the most fundamental relationship 
among the persons. Scheler writes, "Men belongs together because they are 
togetlier:i55 
Sympathy can also be found between a personal being and other beings in 
the world. It is a common experience that during childhood one may personalize 
something as a personal being. For example, a train can be personalized as a 
person with names. This phenomenon can be also found in the worldview of the 
primitive man, who regards the nature as an organism. The relationship between 
man and nature becomes spiritual, which means that they can feel each other. 
This pantheistic worldview is usually concerned with the spiritual "love" of the 
nature. Man is not the master of the nature. Rather, man is in a spiritual unity 
with the n a t u r e . 156 However, it is not the case in the modem scientific world. 
From the viewpoint of natural science, the world is usually regards as an 
inorganic thing. In this perspective, spirits and demons can no longer imagined 
as essential parts of the universe. This mechanical worldview presents a world as 
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an object to the human beings. The world is only the summation of all real 
things. 
As mentioned above, sympathy is always a "feeling-with" and it is a vital 
feeling-state related to the phenomenon of love. Love is essentially a personal 
act: when one person is in love with other, they are fully opened to each other 
and the ego-ness or individuality vanishes. In this way, man becomes a personal 
being in the strictest sense. Scheler writes: 
The more deeply we penetrate into a human being, through knowledge and 
understanding, guided by personal love, the more unmistakable, individual, 
unique, irreplaceable and indispensable does he become in our mind”？ 
In fact, Scheler defined man as ens amans, a personal being in love with others. 
Love is defined as "the movement in which each concrete individual object that 
carries values attains to the highest possible values for it according to its ideal 
nature; or in which it reaches the ideal essential value peculiar to 
The meaning of the idea of person in love, or ens amans, was discussed in 
the treatise "Ordo amoris", first appeared in 1916. Scheler focused himself on the 
problem of love and man and he argues that man is neither a thinking thing nor a 
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willing thing. Man is a loving person, for love is the essence of human beings. 
He writes: 
Man, before he is an ens cogitans or an ens volens, is an ens amans (Der 
Mensch ist, ehe er ein ens cogitans ist oder ein ens volens, ens amans).^^^ 
The ordo amoris represents the basic structure of human feelings and value-
preferences of a person. Therefore, every unique person has its own ordo 
amoris: 
Whoever has the ordo amoris of a man has the man himself {Wer den ordo 
amoris eines Menschens hat, hat den Menschen).”_ 
Love and hatred are fundamental acts of person, which cannot be further reduced 
into other activities. For Scheler, even pain and suffering have their origin in 
love. They would not exist without love. On the other hand, they are the main 
source of sorrow, joy, blissfulness and despair. 
Scheler holds that love is felt in an order, i.e. ordo amoris. But this order of 
love is prior to the acts of knowledge and cognition. Love is prior to knowledge. 
Besides, ordo amoris is a ruler governing the act of preferring and rejecting 
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values. It is a microcosm of the heart, which is not any random preferences of an 
ego but an absolute scale of values. Scheler claims: 
As the geometrical structure of the crystal stands to the crystal, so does the 
ordo amoris stand to the moral subject of the person. 
The ordo amoris is an autonomous "logic of the heart," which is independent of 
the logic of reason. This ordered system of values is solely originated from the 
perception of values by the heart. The logic of heart has its own rules and 
measures and this order is the same in all personal beings. 
Apparently, however, there exist different orders and measures in the real 
world. Scheler explained that there are incommensurable value systems in 
reality, but the ethics of ordo amoris does not necessarily lead to relativism. He 
argues that the difference in the feeling of values is not a result from different 
feelings from different persons. Rather, it is due to the misinterpretation or 
misunderstanding of the ordo amoris by different persons. When the feeling is 
falsely occupied with ressentiment and hatred, there will be a disorder of ordo 
amoris. Scheler argues that: 
Also man, filled with ressentiment, originally loves such objects which he 
hatres in his state - and it is only hatred towards absence of their possession, 
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or his weakness (Ohnmacht) to acquire them, which radiate secondarily into 
these objects. 
The ordo amoris is an original objective order of love, which is universal in 
nature. In the fundamental act of love, which is the primary act of the person, 
there is no distortion of the order, but in reality this order of love may be 
disordered or distorted in case of particular pe r sons .Di so rde r results when 
hatred is felt instead of love. In the act of hatred, there is a confusion of the order 
of love. Scheler argues that hatred is originated when a particular person is 
disvalued. When there is a different in the order of love among persons in a 
community, comparison may occur and hence the original order of value is 
disturbed. 
In ”ordo amoris,” Scheler also distinguishes two kinds of love: the false 
love and the true love. False love can be an egoistic love of the self or a love of 
things. The person in the act of false love cannot feel the feelings of other 
persons. On the other hand, the true love is always the love between persons and 
hence it is necessarily a personal love {Personliebe). In personal love, the 
persons are completely opened to each other. They can share all their feelings on 
one hand and values on the other. 
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For Scheler, the Christian Love should not be regards as the love of the 
ultimate Truth or the highest Good. On the other hand, it is a love of the personal 
God. For the God is neither a objective thing nor an abstract idea. God is the 
person who is eternally in the act of love of the world (amare mundum in Deo). 
In the love of God, man is no longer homo naturalis or homo sapiens. 
Rather, man becomes homo religious, who is neither a metaphysician nor a 
theologian but a creature who prays.164 Unlike the heroes in the Greek tragedies, 
the person in love is a searcher for God (Gottsucher), who will finally die and 
return to God's embrace: "Our heart is quiet until it rests in thee (inquietum cor 
nostrum donee requiescat in te)^ ^^^ 
Scheler emphasizes that homo religiosus is neither a philosopher nor a 
theologian, for they rationalize God into a mere idea. Metaphysica can be served 
as ancilla fidei, which is solely for the sake of faith. However, it should not be 
ancilla theologiae of any kind. He asserted that: 
The true God is not so empty and rigid as the God of metaphysics. The true 
God is not so narrow and not so alive as the God of mere faith. ^ ^^  
Besides, Scheler made use of the German words Aufweis, Nachweis and Beweis 
to illustrate the different degrees of love. Aufweis is the original relationship with 
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God, which is a direct experience with God. It is shown and is not a proof 
(knowledge). Nachweis is the rethinking of the experience from the demand of 
reason, which looks for rational explanation. Finally, it is subjected to the 
rational proofs.^^^ Scheler argues that the proof for the existence of God is 
superfluous, since God can be felt simply in the experience of the act of personal 
love. 
Some critics may accuse Scheler of mysticism or pantheism, but these 
accusations are sceptical and doubtful. At least, Scheler did not claim that love is 
a mystical experience. He emphasizes that love is the unique phenomenon of 
man. Man is not only a pure rational animal but also an animal with love. 
In fact, Scheler's notion of love is a return to Blaise Pascal's discovery: Le 
coeur a ses raisons. In Formalism in Ethics, Scheler has already shown that the 
sphere of feeling cannot be reduced into the sphere of reason. He followed the 
true insight of the French philosopher: there is the logic of heart (logique du 
coeur), which is outside the knowledge of the logic of reason {logique de la 
raison). The heart is always occupied with different feeling-states of a personal 
being. It is also the organ of perceiving order of value as well as the Ordo amor is. 
Pascal also awared of the problem of desordre du coeur, which leads to a 
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distortion of the order of heart and other the perception of feelings of other 
persons. 
Pascal's logique du coeur is the kernel idea of Scheler's concept of love. 
Love is a personal act by heart, not by reason. He even argues that love is the 
mother of spirit and reason itself. In order to understand further Scheler's 
concept of personal being, it is necessary to clarify the concept of reason and 
spirit. 
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Ill Sprit and Life 
In this section, Scheler's concepts of Geist and Leben will be discussed in 
details. Geist is an important keyword in the Scheler's philosophical 
anthropology. In modem German philosophy, especially German idealism, Geist 
is indubitably a fundamental concept. For example, Hegel's magnum opus, 
Phdnomenologie des Geistes, is a study on the universal reason. Here the word 
Geist is translated as spirit, reason or mind. 
However, Scheler's notion of Geist should never be regards as a universal 
reason. It is a serious misconception to translate Scheler's Geist into reason or 
rational soul, since Geist is a broader concept than logos or reason. Scheler 
argues that: 
The Greeks affirmed the existence of such a principle and called it reason. 
We will use a more inclusive term and call it "spirit" - a term which includes 
the concept of reason, but which, in addition to conceptual thought, also 
includes the intuition of essences and a class of voluntary and emotional 
acts such as kindness, love, remorse, reverence, wonder, bliss, despair and 
free decision.^^^ 
For Scheler, the essence man is spirit. The following discussion will focus on 
Scheler's notion of Geist, hereinafter translated as spirit. 
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Scheler's theory on spirit can be found in his famous talk, Die 
Sonderstellung des Menschen, later published as Die Stellung des Menschen im 
Kosmos. The kernel question of this talk is: "What is man?" In the modem world, 
man is usually regards as a kind of mammal called Homo sapiens. The 
fundamental difference between man and other animals, especially chimpanzees, 
is a main concern in Scheler's philosophical anthropology. ^ ^^  In order to reveal 
the essence of man, Scheler tries to distinguish four stages of life in plants, 
animals and man. 
According to Scheler, the lowest form of psychic life is vital feeling, drive 
or impulse (Gefuhlsdmng). This psychic act is simply a "toward" or "moving 
from" something. It is not a conscious act, but a natural tendency for nutrition, 
reproduction, etc. Although vital feeling is the lowest kind of psychical activities, 
it is the source of energy of all living organisms. This notion is similar to the 
Aristotelian concept of vegetative soul.^o 
The second form of psychic life is instinct, which is more advanced than the 
vegetative soul. Unlike the vital feeling, instinct is a purposive act that is in a 
conscious state. In Schopenhauer's terminology, instinct is different from blind 
will, for the latter is an original energy of life.^ ^^ 
91 
The third one is the habitual mode of behaviour or associative memory. This 
form is best represented by Parlov's behaviourism: while bringing a dog some 
food, a bell is ringed. When the dog hears the melody later, it secretes salivary 
juice even without any food provided. The action is clearly not a voluntary 
action. Rather, it is a conditional reflex, which is uncontrollable by the will.�72 
The fourth stage is practical intelligence. It is aimed at solving problems, for 
example, by means of making use of simple tools. It is the ability to adapt to the 
environment in the best possible way. According to a Gestalt psychologist called 
W. Kohler, practical intelligence is not only found in human beings but also in 
some animals such as apes and chimpanzees. Therefore, practical intelligence 
should not be monopolised by human beings.173 
Consequently, one cannot find a qualitative difference between human 
beings and chimpanzees because both of them possess practical intelligence. 
There are only quantitative differences, such as the volume of the brain. Man 
cannot be assumed as an animal with practical intelligence, since it is not an 
essential characteristic of man. Scheler argues that there are two serious 
problems in modem theories of evolution: man becomes an ape (Simiation) and 
ape becomes a man {Homination)}^^ 
92 
Are there still any essential differences between man and other creatures? 
Scheler's answer is positive: the essential characteristic of man is spirit. Scheler 
argues that only man possesses the spirit, which is absent in other animals. The 
phenomenon of spirit, however, cannot be derived from the theories of 
evolution. 175 Man is defined as a spiritual being, for there are several 
characteristics of human spirit: 
Firstly, the essence of spirit is the concept of Weltoffenheit (world-
openness). Scheler argues that man is a special animal who is opened to the 
world: 
The spiritual being, then, is no longer subject to his drives and its 
environment. Instead, it is "free from the environment," or, as we shall say, 
"open to the world." Such a being has a world.^^^ 
Other animals live in the world cannot open themselves to the world, since they 
are limited by the surrounding environment (Umwelt) as well as their drives. 
They cannot overcome the environmental settings, and hence they have to attach 
themselves to the environment and accept the reality of the nature. They cannot, 
on the other hand, detach themselves from their vital feelings and drives. Spirit is 
93 
not condemned to the environment. All spiritual being can free from his 
relationship with the world and life. He argues: 
To be human means to oppose this reality with an emphatic " N o . " � 7 
Spirit is always opposite to the reality. Only spirit is capable of reversing the 
reality and says no. Through the spiritual acts, a person can de-actualise the 
world and surpass the reality. 
Second, Scheler argues that spirit is capable of objectification which means 
that man can determine the objective nature of things. ^ ^^  It is man's unique ability 
to objectify the world and to acquire knowledge about the world. He perceives 
the world through the spatio-temporal dimension, but he can objectify the world 
beyond the order of time and space. Scheler claims that animals have no object 
because they cannot objectify the world.^^^ In addition to the capacity of 
objectifying the environment, man can even objectify his own physiological and 
psychological states into form (Gehalt) and schema. Therefore, spirit is 
responsible for the development of the self-consciousness. Scheler writes: 
Concentration, self-consciousness and the capacity to objectify the original 
centers of resistance encountered by the drives - these characteristics form a 
single indivisible structure which, as much, is peculiar only to 
94 
Without spirit, there will be a problem to build up the self-image of a person. 
Therefore, consciousness can only be found in personal beings with spiritual 
acts. 
Scheler further argues that only man can concentrate on the pure essence of 
a thing. Man can distinguish quality {So-sein) and essence (Was-sein) from 
existence (Dasein). However, the primordial relationship between man and the 
world is not a self-consicousness and an objectified world. Man and 
environment are given in the unity of the universe. ^ ^^  
Scheler defines the center of action in the spirit as "person." Self-
consciousness is the necessary condition for a man to act solely according to his 
will and free himself from his own drives and vital feelings. Only human being 
can know the essence of things by means of essence-intuition. Therefore, the 
person is not a thing, for the latter is dead and inactive. Scheler argues: 
Spirit is the only being incapable of becoming an object. It is pure actuality. 
It has its being only in and through the execution of its acts. 182 
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The human spirit is the source of objectification of the world but it is itself not 
applicable to any objectification. Therefore, it is erroneous to study an isolated 
person. 
Spirit is a special phenomenon of man and is possessed by all human beings. 
Without spirit, all personal acts such as personal love and sympathy become 
impossible. He agrees with Dilthey that spirit should be studied in an 
autonomous discipline, which is independent of other specific sciences of man 
such as physiology, psychology and sociology. 
The elementary difference between animal and man is the presence of Geist, 
which makes human life highly independent of drives, and independent of 
attachment to environment. Man can be defined as a spiritual being. 
For the relationship between spirit and life, there are two major theories: the 
positive theory and the negative theories. The former regards spirit as an 
autonomous self and the source of energy of life. The latter suggests that spirit 
can only repress his impulses. Scheler rejects the two notions. He argues that 
human being as a vital being capable of spiritual acts, but spirit is not the original 
source of energy. Both the positive theory and the negative theory are one-sided. 
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In the positive theories, man is becoming the God; in the negative theories, one 
cannot explain the purpose of will to live. 
On the problem of the relationship between spirit and life, Scheler notices 
that spirit and life are always in conflict with each other. Spiritual act is an 
overcoming of vital acts, since life is the lower form of being. However, Scheler 
argues that the lower form of being can be the fundamental mode. He claims, 
"the lowest forms are the most powerful, and the highest the most impotent.83 
Spirit, the higher form, cannot realize through its own power but through the 
energy of the lower form of life. He argues: 
Spirit and life are related in the same way. It is true that spirit can acquire 
energy through the process of sublimation. It is true that vital impulses can 
enter into the autonomous and meaningful structure of the spirit and , in so 
doing, lend power to the spirit in the individual and in history. 184 
Sublimation is a will to unify the human spirit and the human life. It is a natural 
process for the lower to become the higher. It is a struggle for a man to unify 
himself. 
The relation of spirit and life is a way of interpenetration that the spirit is 
vitalized and the vital impulses are spiritualised. Spirit is no longer an impotent 
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form of being, and vital impulses are no longer blind wills. They are sublimed 
into a powerful personal being. This is a process of becoming: 
Spirit, originally impotent, and the demonic drive originally blind to all 
spiritual ideas and values, may fuse in the growing process of ideation, or 
spiritualization, in the sublimation of the drives and in the simultaneous 
actualization, or vitalization, of the spirit. This interaction and exchange 
represent the goal of finite being and becoming. ^ ^^  
Scheler's discussion is followed by a discussion on the mind-body dualism. 
Descartes is misleading to argue that there is a substantial soul in the pineal 
gland. Scheler argues that it is needless to presuppose a special substance to 
connect the soul and the body. The mind-body problem has monopolized the 
discussion of philosophical dualism. But the fundamental dualism is not the 
parallelism of body and soul. Rather, it is the correlation of spirit and life. He 
writes: 
Thus it is neither body and soul nor brain and mind that set up an essential 
dualism. We may say that the mind-body problem has lost the metaphysical 
significance it has had for centuries. Instead, the dualism which we 
encounter in man and which we experience ourselves is of a higher order: it 
is the antithesis between spirit and life.� 
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Scheler argues that all naturalistic theories of man, such as mechanism and 
vitalism, should be rejected. It is because it is one-sided in the phenomena of 
human life and neglects the autonomous being of the spirit. Spirit and life are 
two irreducible phenomena of human being. In this sense, Scheler follows 
Spinoza's tradition: 
...reason is incapable of ruling the passions except in so far it becomes a 
kind of "passions" through sublimation, as we would say today, then the 
naturalistic theories have erred in completely disregarding the originality 
and autonomy of the spirit. ^ ^^  
Scheler has proposed a dualistic ontology: life and spirit are two irreducible 
phenomena of man. This thesis is in resonance with Pascal's notion of homo 
duplex. 
Philosophical anthropology is the discipline concerning the problem of man. 
The basic questions of philosophical anthropology are: "What is man?" "What is 
man's place in the universe?" 
On the first question, Scheler has suggested that man is a person, whose 
essential characteristic is the possession of spirit. The essence of spirit is its 
openness to the world. On the second, it is clear that man is not alone in nature. 
Instead, he is a person in the universe. 
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What is the meaning of universe or world? For the Greeks, the universe is 
expressed as kosmos, which should not be regards as a mere environment but an 
order. The universe is an order with its reason. The world cannot come from 
nothing. However, the concept of universe is different in the Jewish-Christian 
culture, which regards the world as a creation from the God. God creates the 
world ex nihilo. Renaissance humanists often distinguished between Nature and 
nature. God is acting in the capitalized Nature {Natura natumns), while nature is 
simply a created universe. It is an instrument of God {natura naturata). 
For Scheler, the world is neither determined by rationality nor by God. It is 
open to our spirit. Every person has his own relationship with nature. We can 
objectify the world into an object and accounts for different phenomena of the 
world. But the world is primordially given to us as an environment to us. This 
primordial world should never be reduced into a world of inorganic place of 
evolution of Homo sapiens nor a world of economy of homo fabor. 
Man is a spiritual being, who discovers he is in the world. Man is a special 
being who ask the questions: What is man? Why is there a world as such, and 
why and how do I exist? Why are there something rather than nothing? The 
Greeks are correct to say that man is an animal who is able to wonder 
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(thaumazein). But most of us have lost the power of wondering and the faculty of 
fantasy in the masses. 
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Chapter Four Conclusion 
This thesis is an attempt to re-construct Scheler's philosophical 
anthropology through discussions of two basic concepts: person and man. It has 
been revealed that man has a unique position in the kosmos, namely, man is a 
personal being. 
Generally speaking, Scheler tries to explain the phenomena of man in a 
comprehensive manner, rather than singling out any one-sided phenomenon of 
man. For Scheler, man is a personal being. Since person is not a thing, every 
personal being is unique and irreplaceable. The person is neither an isolated ego 
nor a subject, who is merely a lonely being in the world. On the other hand, the 
phenomenon of person includes all the different personal relationships such as 
"I," "thou," "we," "they," etc. Among the persons of a community, personal acts 
take place. Of these personal acts, the most important one is the act of love. 
Person is the bearer of value on one hand and is bearer of feelings on the 
other. Man can be defined as ens amans, a being in love. Man is a personal being 
who possess different feelings-states. For feelings such as sympathy and 
ressentiment, there are the personal acts of love and hatred respectively. These 
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personal acts presuppose a network of relationships between the persons. 
Among these acts, love is an important phenomenon: man is a loving being {ens 
amans). 
However, the problem of love has been marginalized in the modem world. 
Even the personal love of the Christian God is reduced into the purchase of an 
abstract idea of God. For Scheler, the God in the modem world is replaced by the 
Aristotelian sophist-God, homo religious is substituted by monks, values are 
changed into laws, and love is forgotten by reason. 
Scheler argues that feelings or emotions have their own "logic." He follows 
Pascal's insight that there is a logic of heart: le coeur a ses mis on. The heart has 
its own logic, which the reason cannot know. The logic of heart should never be 
reduced to the logic of reason. Consequently, man is a personal being with heart 
and he should never be conceived as a mere animal rationale or a cogito. Not 
surprisingly, Scheler's project of philosophical is based on many ideas of Pascal's 
philosophical thoughts. In my opinion, Scheler can be renamed as 
"phenomenological Pascal," in order to emphasise the similarities between the 
two philosophers. 
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According to Scheler, the essence of man lies in his spirit {Geist). It is 
necessary to regard man as a spiritual person. The spirit is not merely an empty 
rational soul but it is the center of all personal acts. However, a man with spirit 
only will have no vital forces or vitality. Spirit and life are two irreducible 
phenomena of all personal being. 
In Scheler's philosophical anthropology, man is necessarily a personal being 
and all human beings is always related the God. God is a key figure in the 
personal act of love. One may argue that this concept of man cannot be applied to 
non-Christian cultures. However, it should be reminded that Scheler's God is 
neither an abstract metaphysical idea nor a theological concept, but he is also a 
personal being. The existence of this personal God cannot be proved by the logic 
of reason. But this God exists evidently when one follows the logic of heart 
proposed by Pascal and Scheler. 
Scheler died of heart attack in 1928, with his project on Philosophical 
Anthropology left unfinished. Nonetheless, Scheler's work is undoubtedly 
influential to many thinkers of the movement of philosophical anthropology. For 
example, Ernst Cassirer (An Essay On Man, 1945), Arnold Gehlen {Early Man 
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and Late Culture, 1963), Helmuth Plessner {Contitio Humana, 1965) and 
Michael Landmann {Fundamental Anthropology, 1982). 
Many other scholars from the fields of philosophy, theology and sociology 
have also acknowledged their researches to Scheler. Heidegger is another 
philosopher who was impressed by Scheler's effort, although his main concern is 
the fundamental problem of being rather than philosophical anthropology. ^ ^^  
Karol Wojtyla, the present Pope John Paul II, is also deeply interested in the 
ethical theories of Scheler. He has written his habilitation thesis and many 
articles on Scheler's p h i l o s o p h y . ! 8 9 worth notice that there are converging 
points between Catholic ethics and Scheler's philosophical anthropology, 
especially in the context of ethical personalism and the philosophy of love. 
In 1927, Scheler writes: "man is more of a problem to himself at the present 
time than ever before in all recorded history. His words can also be applied in 
the current "postmodern" era. One may spend most of his time on money, 
entertainment, technology, etc. Pascal might have said there are now even fewer 
people who study man. 
It is clear that there is an urgent need to reflect on the present human 
condition, but it is not an easy task to achieve. One might never able to propose 
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an answer to the question, who is man? Nonetheless, it is extremely important 
for us to continue the movement of philosophical anthropology, i.e., to answer 
the question: "What is man? What is man's place in nature?" 
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